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"Rationalism in morals may persuade men in one moment that their selfishness is a peril 
to society and in the next moment it may condone their egoism as a necessary and 
inevitable element in the total social harmony."
Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (1960:41)
Our current national policies for combating the use of illicit drugs can be 
understood as reasonable in the sense that policy makers are trying to protect against the 
self-destructive behavior of drug users. Are they rational? Clearly, those persons who 
choose to use certain mind- and body-altering drugs assume risks such as addiction, loss 
of good judgment, and perhaps irreparable physiological damage. The costs, however, 
extend beyond individual drug users. The violence that is associated with the buying, 
selling, and use of certain drugs claims not only those who are drug-involved, but innocent 
bystanders as well. The truth is that many families, neighborhoods, communities, and 
large metropolitan areas are now suffering from the so called ravages of crack-cocaine.
Many social control mechanisms, including the War on Drugs, can be viewed as 
rational, or even profitable social phenomena. There is no question that some people who 
deal in controlled-substances make vast sums of money. And, combating drug dealers and 
drug cartels has created an industry. Many politicians, bureaucrats, criminologists, and 
drug rehabilitators have enlisted in the war and are engaged in fighting the battle to control 
illicit drug use. The drug war has produced numerous organizations, bureaucracies, and 
institutions and injected life into many that had heretofore lost their social relevance.
Perhaps, the truth is that the drug war and its soldiers, villains, and victims are a 
part of a persistent social arrangement. Whether the arrangement is rational or reasonable, 
in one sense, it is matter of values. The current research examines the rationality of 
certain aspects of the drug war in a more specific and technical sense.
ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on understanding emerging relationships between criminal 
courts and drug treatment agencies, primarily in terms of consequences for drug treatment 
agencies. It is expected that court-related drug treatment programs will tend to become 
standardized, formalized, and rationalized as their relationships with courts develop. The 
conceptual framework for the study combines the constructs of social control, Weberian 
bureaucratization, and key concepts from contemporary organizational theories.
Generally, I expect that the degree of bureaucratization of drug treatment programs will 
increase as the level of interaction with courts increases. More specifically, I expect that 
frequency of court-drug treatment program interaction will be related to formality in the 
relationships. Generally, the data support this expectation.
THE RATIONALIZATION OF DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS: 
THE EMERGENCE OF COURT-ENFORCED 
DRUG TREATMENT BUREAUCRACIES
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION
Introduction
Increasingly, criminal courts are utilizing drug treatment programs in efforts to 
supplement judicial sanctions and to deal with drug-related crimes (Milkman and Beaudin 
1993; Zimring and Hawkins 1992). A recent study concludes that many courts utilize 
some form of drug treatment approach as a standard component in the disposition of cases 
against defendants who have substance abuse problems (Milkman and Beaudin 1993).
The reasons for the increased use of court-mandated drug treatment are many and 
diverse. Some argue that increased drug use and stricter criminal statutes have led to the 
overburdening of state courts, forcing them to search for solutions to caseload backlogs 
and delays in dispositions (Goerdt and Martin 1989; Inciardi 1993; Milkman and Beaudin 
1993). Others stress the limits of monetary, material, and personnel resources (Inciardi 
1993; Milkman and Beaudin 1993; Zimring and Hawkins 1992). For instance, budget 
cutbacks may limit the available resources for dealing with drug law violators. Still others 
point to the need for a change in philosophy toward all drug-related behaviors — a shift
2
3from the crime control approach to a public health-treatment approach (Tauber 1993).
Perhaps because there is limited evidence that drug treatment works, some 
researchers have developed arguments that favor coercion to improve the outcomes of 
treatment for drug involved criminal defendants (Inciardi 1992; 1993; Tauber 1993;
Nation Council on Drug Policy 1993; The White House 1992). Proponents of mandatory 
drug treatment argue that judicial leaders and policy makers are trying to resolve issues 
brought before them through collaborative partnerships with public and private institutions 
(Hillsman 1993; Inciardi 1992; 1993; Tauber 1993; Nation Council on Drug Policy 1993; 
The White House 1992). It may be that the association between courts and drug 
treatment programs are part of such collaborative efforts1 (Casey, 1994; Hillsman, 1993; 
President's Commission on Model State Drug Laws, 1993). The focus of this research, 
court-enforced drug treatment,2 is one example of such collaborative efforts.
Statement of the Question
Courts and drug treatment programs have begun to work together in drug 
intervention efforts. Courts can sanction and coerce and drug treatment programs provide
1 Other collaborative efforts focus on court cases involving children, their families, and domestic 
violence.
2 The term, court enforced drug treatment, refers to a broad range of existing efforts to incorporate or 
mandate drug treatment strategies into court processes and procedures. Throughout this paper I use the 
term court-enforced treatment; however, I also refer to court-enforced treatment programs as court-drug 
treatment relationships, the collaborative efforts of courts and drug treatment programs. All of these 
terms are meant to be synonymous.
4alternative (i.e., behavioral, chemical, and clinical) approaches to case dispositions. What 
are the consequences of the court-drug treatment collaboration? I decided to narrow the 
focus of my research to one aspect of this relationship. Specifically, are courts extending 
characteristics of formal authority and bureaucratic organization to drug treatment 
programs through inter-organizational ties?3
This thesis seeks to answer this question from the perspective of drug treatment 
staff. My initial objective was to determine a useful method for characterizing existing 
court-drug treatment program relationships. I suspected that the degree of formalization, 
rationalization, and bureaucratization among court-enforced drug treatment programs 
would vary according to the frequency of court-related personnel interaction with drug 
treatment program staff. I also believed that the more court-related personnel4 are 
involved in managing drug treatment programs and mandating treatment for drug 
offenders, the more bureaucratized drug treatment programs would become. Evidence of 
the rationalization of drug treatment programs would manifest itself in the incorporation 
of standard court-related goals, objectives, and procedures into drug treatment 
procedures, goals, objectives, and program components.
3 The concept of formal authority is from Weber (1978) and will be defined more fully in subsequent 
discussions. Likewise, the concept of bureaucratization is from Weber (1978). It incorporates a host of 
social processes and will be defined in detail.
4 This term refers to the activities of judges, court administrators, probation officers, prosecutors, and 
public defenders. Here, the focus is on three primary issues. Who is involved? How are they involved? 
What is the extent of their involvement?
Chapter II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Review of Relevant Literature
Aday and Thomson define social control as "...punishment for a violation, which is 
an individual or collective act that departs from formal or informal norms" (1992). All 
human societies both impose constraints and limitations on the behavior of their individual 
members and punish people for violations of norms (Aday 1990; Durkheim [1893] 1984; 
Ritzer 1984; Weber 1968). Some have argued that individuals comply to a greater or 
lesser degree with norms and laws, partly as result of their attachments to norm- and law- 
abiding significant others (Hirschi 1969). Others maintain that individuals adhere to 
normative standards because of their concern with a loss of positive standing or status 
within the dominant culture (Aday 1990; Robertson 1987). And, still others contend that 
compliance with norms also results in part from the effects of threatened or imposed 
sanctions (Maume and Aday 1994: under review).1
The control of drug use (i.e., norm-, value-, and attitude-based formal and informal 
sanctions) is one of the most fascinating aspects of American society. Since the 1906 Pure
1 These are simplified, but useful applications of theories of social control.
5
6Food and Drug Act, efforts to control6 drug use in the U.S. have revolved around two 
opposing paradigms: the crime control model and the treatment model (Aday and 
Thomson 1992; King 1972; Musto 1973; Zimring and Hawkins 1992). The crime control 
model views drug users as potentially dangerous deviants and suggests threats and 
punishments as the proper mechanisms of control (Aday and Thomson 1992; King 1972; 
Musto 1973). Pursuit of this model has resulted in criminal laws, the enforcement of these 
laws, and the development of formal mechanisms to control drug possession and use 
(Aday and Thomson 1992; King 1972; Musto 1973; Zimring and Hawkins 1992). The 
treatment model considers the habitual drug user as a person in need of medical and 
psychological treatment for a chemical dependency, which is characterized by chronic and 
relapsing disorder (Brill and Lieberman 1972; Inciardi 1990; McCoy and Block 1992; 
Zimring and Hawkins 1992). Social controls within the treatment model tend to be 
informal and oriented to persuasion. These approaches emphasize managing, reducing, or 
eliminating the psychological, sociological, and physiological aspects of drug dependency.
6 Why does our society wish to control drugs? The complexities and motivations behind the control of 
drug usage are not a primary focus of this study. However, it is interesting to note some of the arguments 
behind the criminalization of drugs. Some authors and researchers (King 1972; Musto 1973) point to the 
wider society's perceptions of certain ethnic groups and the association of those populations with certain 
drugs (i.e., African Americans and cocaine, Mexican immigrants and marijuana, and Chinese immigrants 
and opium). Others cite evidence that drugs lower inhibitions, erode personal behavioral controls, and 
cause individuals to loose their willpower, leading them to engage in what many consider concomitant 
crimes (e.g., prostitution, robbery, and murder; Inciardi 1992; 1993). Perhaps, drug control is the result 
of laws aimed at stemming the loss of personal control or willpower. Viewed from this perspective, drug 
laws and policies appear to be a governmental substitute for public and personal responsibility regarding 
drugs (much in the same way that speed limit laws discourage dangerous driving). Nonetheless, this issue 
and this analogy grow even more complex when one asks, "Why do manufacturers offer to the general 
public, vehicles capable of 140 miles-per-hour?" Why do other substances such as alcohol and caffeine 
bear few regulations or restrictions in comparison to certain other drugs? Certainly, there is no shortage 
of research that demonstrates that alcohol is a primary causal factor in many forms of violence in our 
society (i.e., domestic, public, and motor vehicle).
7There is little or no emphasis on coercion or formal punishment for drug-taking behavior 
(Aday and Thomson 1992; Inciardi 1990; McCoy and Block 1992; Zimring and Hawkins 
1992).
Other efforts in the early part of this century and in the 1960's were based on 
involuntary civil commitment, which involved removing drug abusers from public and 
placing them in a hospital environment. These hospital "clinics" also were considered a 
form of mandatory drug treatment, albeit a kinder and gentler form (Musto 1973; 
Hafemeister and Amirshahi 1992). Involuntary civil commitment remains a complex issue 
because there are legal limitations to what the government can do to drug users who pose 
no threat to themselves or society other than their drug usage.7
Many regard mandatory drug treatment as the most promising solution for the 
complex problems associated with substance abuse (Cooper and Trotter 1994; Inciardi 
1992,1993; Leukefeld and Tims 1982; Office of National Drug Control Policy 1993,
1994; Tauber 1993; The White House 1992).8 However, some researchers believe the 
efficacy of drug treatment has not yet been fully demonstrated (Biemacki 1986; Goldkamp 
and Weiland 1993). Furthermore, drug treatment programs are organized in diverse ways, 
pursue various treatment modalities, and have differing program objectives.
7 Hafemeister and Amirshahi's (1992) manuscript, Civil Commitment for Drug Dependency: The Judicial 
Response, is a very comprehensive study on involuntary civil commitment of drug users.
8 Cooper and Trotter's (1994), Drug Case Management and Treatment Intervention Strategies in the 
State and Local Courts, and the National Center for State Courts' The Justice System Journal (1994, Vol. 
17, No. 1) are the latest and most comprehensive publications available on the subject of mandatory drug 
treatment.
8A central question in the examination of the social control of drugs concerns the 
source and character of authority to impose either punishment or treatment. Weber 
(1968) distinguished three types of authority: rational, traditional, and charismatic. The 
current study focuses on rational authority, in which the exercise of social control is 
legitimized by rules. In the U.S., crime control generally, and the control of certain drugs 
in particular, have operated through rational authority and the logic of a deterrence 
doctrine (Aday and Thomson 1992). The logic of deterrence is grounded in the 
assumption that punishment will discourage and reduce the use of drugs and drug-related 
behaviors. Hence, this study defines deterrence as the use of negative sanctions aimed at 
discouraging certain activities, the use, possession, and sale of certain drugs.9
Furthermore, this thesis concentrates on the social control of drugs efforts through 
formal and bureaucratic processes. One of the major consequences of the our society's 
rational authority-b&scd approach to drugs has been "the creation of laws" and law 
enforcement bureaucracies whose function is to create and direct drug deterrence 
strategies (Chambliss and Seidmann, 1982:291). There is considerable research that 
focuses on the rationalization and bureaucratization of the American criminal justice 
system (Blumberg 1979; Chambliss and Seidmann 1982; Heyderbrand and Seron 1990). 
Much of that research emphasizes a continuing trend toward bureaucratic responses to 
drug problems (Aday and Thomson 1992; King 1972; Musto 1973).
9 Deterrence can be reflected in other than criminal laws or policies (e.g., high taxes on cigarettes and 
alcohol to discourage their use).
9According to Weber, a rational-legal authority will manifest itself through a formal, 
bureaucratic structure10 (Weber 1978: 217-226). Bureaucracies tend to be organized 
around fulfilling predetermined goals; a rational means of achieving such goals is an 
inherent characteristic of bureaucratic structure (Scott 1987:31):
"From the rational system perspective, organizations are instruments to attain specified goals. 
How blunt or fine an instrument they are depends on many factors that are summarized by the 
concept of rationality of structure. The term rationality in this context is used in the harrow 
sense or technical or functional rationality...and refers to the extent to which a series of actions is 
organized in such a way as to lead to predetermined goals with maximum efficiency. Thus, 
rationality refers not only to the selection of goals but to their [organization and] 
implementation."
Blumberg's thesis (1979) on courts as rational bureaucracies provides this study with the 
groundwork for examining some of the consequences of the relationship between courts 
and drug treatment programs. Blumberg asserts that courts are bureaucratic entities with 
structures and processes that are aimed at carrying out the goals and objectives of courts 
(1979). This is particularly true for contemporary large metropolitan courts that handle 
vast numbers of criminal cases with some degree of efficiency (Blumberg 1979; Chambliss 
and Seidmann 1982; Heyderbrand and Seron 1990). However, the pursuit of criminal 
court efficiency is not without consequences (Blumberg 1979; Chambliss and Seidmann 
1982; Slate 1990; Tauber 1993). Some believe it has produced bureaucratic structures
10 Weber's conception of bureaucracies includes a list of characteristics inherent in their administrative 
structure(Weber 1978: 220-221): 1) a fixed division of labor and specialization administrative staff 
members; 2) a hierarchical structure among departments, offices, and personnel; 3) the accomplishment of 
organizational goals through directives, standards, guidelines, rules, and procedures; 4) the distinction 
between personal and organizational resources, specifically, the presence of formalized financial and 
budgetary categories and procedures; 5) personnel are selected on the basis of formal knowledge, 
credentials, training or other background skills and experiences, and they typically view their work as a 
career.
10
and procedures, such as plea bargaining and other negotiation-based case management 
techniques, that tend to undermine traditional due processes and "...exalt the goals and 
requirements of the court organization itself" (Blumberg 1979:146):
"...rational-instrumental goals of the court organization, in its urgent demand for guilty pleas, 
have produce a bargain-counter, assembly-line system of criminal justice which is incompatible 
with traditional due process...Traditional constitutional elements of criminal law, when placed in 
the institutional setting of a modem criminal court, are reshaped by a bureaucratic organization 
to serve its requirements and goals."
Heyderbrand and Seron (1990) discuss four aspects of courts that reflect this 
bureaucratization. Discussion of these points is relevant to the current study because it 
provides an additional, useful way of thinking about the way courts have begun to extend 
their own form of organization and authority into their relationships with drug treatment 
programs. First, court business is routinized; that is the mission of courts is achieved, in 
significant degree, through highly routinized work (Heyderbrand and Seron, 1990). The 
operations and procedures associated with processing court caseloads, particularly in large 
courts, tend to be stable, routine, and repetitive.
...there are some definite changes occurring in the organizational structure of courts, 
commonly referred to as bureaucratization...It is as if Max Weber's pessimistic vision of 
the "iron cage" — the increasing and inevitable bureaucratization of modem life is 
accepted as axiomatic...the bureaucratization of the judiciary, like the bureaucratization 
of the world, cannot be avoided (Heyderbrand and Seron, 1990:137).
As a result, many courts have developed routine ways of handling the recent flood 
of drug cases (Casey 1994; Inciardi 1993; Milkman and Beaudin 1993). A further 
extension of this process is that a significant number of these courts also have begun to
11
develop routine ways of collaborating with drug treatment programs through court- 
enforced treatment (Casey 1994; Inciardi 1993; Milkman and Beaudin 1993).
Second, court cases are managed according to formalized strategies and 
procedures. Thus, to handle new and evolving issues in workloads, many courts have 
developed formal strategies for managing, resolving, and reducing the number of cases 
that go to trial. As a part of this overall process of formalizing management techniques, 
courts have recently developed new sentencing approaches that rely upon frequent and 
increasingly formal relationships with drug treatment programs. These include a variety of 
increasingly routine management procedures such as pretrial hearings and diversions, 
negotiation-based procedures such as plea bargains, new types of hearings to expedite 
dispute resolution, and other methods such as mandatory settlement hearings. However, 
to make these management strategies work efficiently courts often must change their 
structure as well as their operations and procedures.
Courts, like other organizations, also respond to fluctuations in demand with changes in 
internal processing routines. When a special kind of case [e.g., drug cases] become 
troublesome, courts may establish new routines to accommodate them. For instance,, a 
large influx of criminal appeals in California apparently led to the first district appellate 
court to establish a central legal staff to process "routine" criminal appeals in the name 
of the court. Likewise, trial courts often establish special divisions for particular cases, 
even though their formal jurisdiction is general (Jacob in Boyum and Mather,
1983:199).
A contemporary urban court or metropolitan court typically must deal with a large 
number of drug-related cases and would be expected to have numerous pretrial and post­
trial programs to assist with its burden of defendant risk assessment, processing, and 
sentencing (Milkman and Beaudin, 1993:11).
It [the American criminal court] seems to have articulated structures of a highly rational 
character, calculated to achieve maximum production and near maximum rates of 
conviction. If these are the ends to be pursued, then the criminal court is highly 
"efficient." (Blumberg, 1979:173).
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Third, in response to increasing caseloads and the changing composition of cases, 
many judicial leaders have added court executives and administrative positions to ensure 
the business and operations of the court are professionally managed. These personnel 
have often instituted management techniques to increase productivity and decrease case 
processing time. The flood of drug cases has enhanced this process in many urban courts.
The inundation of these [drug] cases has caused judges to take more control over the 
proceedings, over the entire process, to set the tone for the process and to try to develop 
programs that would be of assistance (Slate, 1990:317)
Finally, fourth, courts have a significant impact on how other organizations and 
institutions operate. Courts sometimes exercise their institutional power to affect 
significantly how societal institutions attempt to deal with society's problems by 
influencing the structures, processes, and procedures that constitute a proposed solution. 
Courts also extend their power and authority into executive and legislative bureaucracies 
through orders that systematically affect law-making and social policy-making decisions.
We can assume that legitimation of...social control of individual criminal activity and of 
the role of law falls not only upon the organs of law enforcement and the executive 
branch, but also on the courts....Under the doctrine of "judicial review," it is judicial 
authority that must ultimately legitimate social control and state intervention in the 
name of formal legality and the rule of law (Heyderbrand and Seron 1990:134).
If courts become involved significantly with drug treatment programs in drug- 
control methods that are outside of both their traditional and contemporary, bureaucratic 
roles, what form is this involvement likely to take? I believe such court involvement, 
particularly court-enforced drug treatment, is likely to follow structures and procedures
13
that are formal, bureaucratic, and rational. Furthermore, I believe relationships between 
courts and drug treatment programs will be based, in a large degree, on the bureaucratic 
procedures of criminal courts.
The implications of efforts aimed at the social control of drugs can be developed 
further through another Weberian concept: formal rationality. According to Ritzer 
(1993:19),"formal rationality means that the search by people for the optimum means to 
a given end is shaped by rules, regulations, and larger [or alternative] social structures." 
The rational authority of courts and the American criminal justice system is constituted 
and legitimized in the rules, processes, and procedures of law (Chambliss and Seidmann 
1982). Court efforts concerning the social control of drugs involve both rational and 
formal procedures. There are two fundamental issues that clarify the distinction between 
rational authority and formal rationality. First, court authority is rational authority. That 
is, court authority is rule-based. Second, pursuit of court authority is achieved through 
formal rationality (Blumberg 1979). Simply put, court organization is explicit and 
specialized for some purpose or objective. In terms of this thesis, when drug treatment is 
mandated and organized through court bureaucracy, it becomes a part of the formal 
(explicit), rational (rule-based) social control efforts of the court. I believe that judicial 
leaders are likely to extend their use of court-enforced treatment strategies through newer 
and more complex alliances with drug treatment programs. At the same time, treatment
14
programs may struggle with how to use the power of the court to coerce their custodial 
clients11 to pursue treatment goals.
Courts have the responsibilities of adjudicating and disposing of criminal cases. 
However, courts often find themselves constrained by their environment. For example, 
the increased demands from the public, politicians, and law enforcement agencies have 
produced harsher laws and penalties (e.g., mandatory minimum prison sentences for 
certain drug offenses; King 1972; Musto 1973). Furthermore, the expectations of the 
public, police, and politicians are very different with regard to the outcome of drug cases. 
These expectations can potentially alter the procedure and outcome of such cases. The 
public, which wants to be protected from the theft of property and the violence that often 
is associated with buying, selling, and the use of certain drugs, would like to see their 
streets and neighborhoods free of all crime — drug-related or otherwise. Police officers, 
who face potentially dangerous situations in the streets, would like to see their work 
rewarded with longer prison sentences (preferably without the possibility of parole). Of 
course, politicians, who sometimes govern according to prevailing public and media 
opinion (at times tough on crime and drugs, having little tolerance for illicit drugs or at 
other times compassionate, showing patience and understanding towards those caught in 
the cycle of drug dependency), want to win elections and advance their agendas. In short, 
social controls, financial and environmental constraints, and conflicting organizational 
demands placed on the court system by executive and policing agencies, as well as public
11 This term refers to those clients who have been referred to treatment as a result of court stipulation or 
disposition.
15
perceptions and political agendas have created pressure on criminal courts to seek out 
alternatives to incarcerating offenders. At the same time, other organizations within the 
court environment introduce constraints, including, for example, prisons that are at or 
beyond their legal capacity.
Increasing public and political demands and environmental constraints extend far 
beyond local court and drug treatment program relationships. They extend to matters of 
national policy. In their critical analysis of the 1989 National Drug Strategy, Aday and 
Thomson (1992), employ a general theory of social control to analyze the logic of the 
National Drug policy. According to Aday and Thomson, the logic of the 1989 White 
House drug policy is grounded in the following argument (pg. 420):
Premise 1: Drug use is dangerous to the user and to others (including unborn children 
and other family members, property owners, and other innocent bystanders).
Premise 2: Some people choose to use drugs in spite of prevailing negative attitudes and 
known risks.
Conclusion: Laws must be passed to discourage drug use, to protect those who might be 
tempted to use drugs, to protect the interest of the community, and to protect those who 
may be victimized by drug users and dealers.
Aday and Thomson contend that the 1989 National Drug Strategy policy argument is 
flawed and that policies based on that logic are flawed as well. They point to theoretical 
and empirical analyses that support alternative strategies. The emerging 1993 national 
strategy on drugs seems to be more reflective of the current views of judicial leaders who 
are proponents of court-enforced drug treatment. According to the President and the 
National Council on Drug Abuse Policy (1993:2), the interim strategy for dealing with the
16
drug problem will take a new direction, which could offer support to alternative efforts 
such as court-enforced drug treatment:
"...mak[ing] drug control policy a cornerstone of domestic policy in particular, 
by acknowledging drug abuse as a public health problem and by linking drug policy 
to our efforts to...reform health care."
"...targeting] hard-core drug users, both inside and outside of the criminal 
system, for treatment to reduce their drug use and its consequences."
"...supporting] research to assist treatment providers to more effectively treat 
drug addicts."
Indeed, the treatment-centered tenets of the 1993 interim strategy appear to be a 
slight departure from the more crime control-based approaches of previous 
administrations. However, a closer inspection of the 1993 policy reveals it to be 
consistent with previous rational authority-based formal social control efforts. Treatment 
will be a part of the interim strategy; however, the current administration will continue to 
emphasize traditional criminal justice based social control efforts against drug use by: 
"...expanding community policing, putting more police on the streets..."
"...promoting] certainty of punishment by ensuring that all drug offenders- 
particularly young offenders- receive some type of sanction [my emphasis] when they 
first encounter the criminal justice system."
"...increasing] international commitment to narcotics control and will work with other 
nations that demonstrate political will to end illegal drug-trafficking."
Some of the changes in the national drug strategy lend legitimacy to court- 
enforced treatment. That is, mandatory treatment, based on the logic of linking formal 
coercive control and drug treatment, may be a viable alternative to traditional drug-control 
(Inciardi 1992; 1993). Furthermore, when viewed from an inter-organizational
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perspective, the compulsory treatment linkage may be mutually beneficial to both courts 
and drug treatment programs. Courts can sanction and coerce, but traditional adjudicative 
efforts regarding drug offenses have not produced persuasive results (Tauber 1993). Drug 
treatment could provide courts with an additional tool for disposing of drug cases, maybe 
with more positive outcomes for offenders. Furthermore, drug treatment programs need 
clients to stay in business (i.e., collect revenue from private, public, and government 
funding and insurance agencies for services rendered). Yet, drug programs lack the 
authority constraints to force clients into treatment or to compel them to stay in treatment. 
Courts can provide drug treatment programs with this force.
Pursuing drug-control goals has produced consequences for both courts and for 
drug treatment organizations. One of the most important issues that court-drug treatment 
program relationships must contend with is the institutionalization of their efforts. One of 
the most significant aspects of this institutionalization process is "...developing working 
relationships between courts and treatment providers, which, while recognizing treatment 
standards and objectives, support the constraints of the criminal process" (Cooper and 
Trotter, 1994:96). As do all organizations, courts and drug treatment organizations 
operate within environments and are part of the environments of other organizations. This 
leads to a central question concerning the nature and consequences of inter-organizational 
relationships. It may be that these linked and increasingly coordinated efforts provide an 
optimal approach to rational social control of the drug problem. Furthermore, the degree 
of bureaucratization of court-enforced drug treatment may be a reflection of the links and
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coordinated efforts between the courts and treatment programs. Court-enforced drug 
treatment combines the coercive power of a court system's rational authority with the 
helping, problem-solving orientation of drug treatment. The result may be that courts 
have a more efficient, predictable, calculable, and controllable12 form of formal social 
control for dealing with drug offenders. Or maybe not.
Courts exercise considerable influence over other organizations and institutions 
with which they intersect, including the drug treatment industry. One way to measure 
inter-organizational relationships is through the observed frequency of routine interactions 
between courts and other agencies, in this case, drug treatment programs (Hall, 1987). 
Another way is to measure the degree of formality associated with these relationships. 
Here, formality concerns the extent to which activities and agreements between courts and 
drug treatment programs are made explicit in documents such as manuals of procedures. 
Furthermore, examining the frequency and the degree of formality in these organizational 
interactions between courts and drug treatment programs provides a beginning point for 
analyzing other aspects of their emerging inter-organizational relationships (Hage and 
Aiken, 1969; Hall 1987). Hall (1987:247) notes that:
Apparently, the presence of a formal agreement is based on frequent and important interactions 
among organizations, with the agreement serving to simplify interactions, since each interaction 
does not need to be weighed in terms of its contributions to the organizations involved.
12 These concepts are borrowed from Ritzer (1993). In his book, the Me Donaldization of Society, he 
asserts these four concepts are the primary goals of Weberian rationalized bureaucracy.
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It is expected that drug treatment programs that become aligned with court- 
enforced programs and become part of court processes will reveal evidence of direct and 
indirect court management in the business and operations of the drug treatment 
programming. For example, courts will begin to determine who will be referred to 
treatment programs and set the conditions of their referral, including dictating the 
conditions of treatment assignment and of release from such programs. Observations of 
court-related personnel, involvement in treatment decisions, and the degree of that control 
over the release of drug defendants from treatment programs provide a way to measure 
the level of such court involvement in the business and operation of drug treatment 
programs.
Organizations may collaborate in problem solving arrangements of power and 
authority, and the ability to punish is a central indicator of organizational power (Hall, 
1987). Courts are potentially powerful in such inter-organizational arrangements because 
they have rule-based authority. In this case, courts have the authority to impose 
punishments on drug-involved offenders. Courts may try to extend such power to drug 
treatment programs through collaborative partnerships, in which the actions of both courts 
and drug treatment staff are "coordinated" (Hall, 1987:255; Jacob in Boyum and Mather, 
1983:199). Coordinating mechanisms provide a "formal structure" for ordering the 
actions of organizations that are engaged in the pursuit of common goals (Jacob in Boyum 
and Mather, 1983:199). Under such arrangements, courts also may extend their authority
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to or over those drug treatment programs with which they collaborate (Heyderbrand and 
Seron 1990).
"...the dominant principle of inter-organizational interaction is to secure cooperation 
and perhaps subservience...Such formally created arrangements are most likely to 
develop among interdependent organizations that have standardized, continuing, and 
repetitious relationships over long periods of time..." (Jacob in Boyum and Mather,
1983:199).
This extension of judicial power and authority into drug treatment programs can 
sometimes be seen in the goals arid actions of those organizations (Hall, 1987; Scott 
1987). The acceptance and, indeed, incorporation of court-related goals and objectives 
into drug treatment program goals and objectives can be measured and taken as evidence 
of the extension of court authority into such programs. For example, the Substance Abuse 
Bureau of the Baltimore City Health Department in Maryland collaborated with Baltimore 
City court officials to develop the Addictions Assessment Unit (AAU). The AAU has a 
single mission that it performs for the court: assessing the severity of addiction for drug 
defendants and, if necessary, referring those defendants to treatment programs. According 
to Diana Anim, the director of the AAU, the general goals and objectives of the AAU are 
organized around the needs of the court, including:
[1.]...distinguishing between those defendants who are experiencing substance abuse 
problems requiring intervention and those defendants whose substance abuse does not 
appear to necessitate referrals at the time of assessment; [2.]...initiating individualized 
treatment referrals for defendants; and, [3.]...assisting the court in making informed 
decisions regarding a defendant's need for treatment (Anim 1994:1).
Inter-organizational alliances such as court-enforced treatment can be understood 
better when the organizational links between them are examined for their degree of
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routinization, formalization, and bureaucratization (Hall, 1987). Organizational change 
resulting from the extension of judicial power and authority often is more apparent when 
viewed from the perspective of the institution over which authority is being extended (i.e., 
drug treatment). While both organizations will change as their relationship becomes more 
institutionalized, the latter is likely to be affected significantly more because as the 
relationship grows, some of the power and authority from drug treatment programs is 
transferred to courts. Thus, this thesis focuses on court-enforced drug treatment from the 
perspective of drug treatment providers.
The Extension of Court Bureaucracy and Authority
Court-enforced drug treatment programs are highly variable in organization and 
purpose. It seems likely that they vary also in degree of routinization, specialization, and 
differentiation of activities. And, it seems likely that they vary also according to their 
contact with courts and court-related personnel. In terms of this research, variations in 
court-drug treatment program contacts are observed in terms of the frequency; the degree 
of formality; level of court-related personnel involvement in decisions; degree of authority 
of court personnel; and, the incorporation of court-related goals, objects, and standard 
procedures into drug treatment programs. My general expectation is that courts are 
formalized, rationalized, and bureaucratized agencies and their characteristics will be 
extended to drug treatment programs with whom they operate. I expect to find a positive
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correlation between the frequency and formality of court-drug treatment program 
organizational interactions and the degree of formalization, rationalization, and 
bureaucratization among court-enforced treatment programs. My general contention 
about court-drug treatment program relationships concentrated on the following question:
Are courts extending characteristics of formal, rational authority and 
bureaucratic organization to drug treatment programs through inter-organizational 
ties?
This thesis seeks to answer this question from the perspective of drug treatment 
staff. I designed a survey instrument for the study with these key connections and 
personnel relationships in mind. The questionnaire and follow-up telephone interviews 
were developed to understand how drug treatment providers perceived several issues 
relating to the influence that courts and court-related personnel have over them. Several 
questions focused on the effects of judicial authority, formal court structure, and court 
operations on drug treatment programs.
Drug treatment program frequency o f  contact with court-related personnel was 
the fundamental variable identified for investigation in the survey. This is because 
frequency of contact between organizations is fundamental to inter-organizational 
relationships (Hage and Aiken , 1969; Hall, 1987).
The degree of formality o f  contacts between organizations is also fundamental to 
inter-organizational relationships (Hage and Aiken, 1969, Hall, 1987). Important 
organizational relationships are rarely left to chance. They are managed by agreements,
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rules, or contracts (Hage and Aiken, 1969; Hall, 1987). This principle reflects the logic of 
formal rationality. It is a general organization principle that the more important the inter- 
organizational relationships between two organizations, the more likely those relationships 
are to be governed according to some formal rationality. Given that, I expect that the 
frequency of contact between court personnel interactions with drug treatment staff will 
reflect the importance of the relationship. Further, I expect the greater the importance of 
the relationship, the greater the likelihood that the relationship will be formalized. Finally, 
the greater the frequency and degree of formality of the relationship, the greater the 
bureaucratic effects on the relationship.
Court-related personnel frequency of decision making involvement in the 
treatment regimen of drug treatment clients should be related to both frequency of contact 
with court-related personnel and the formality of those contacts. In this dimension, courts 
utilize their inter-agency decision making power as part of a problem-solving strategy.
For example, a drug treatment program that has infrequent contact with court-related 
personnel should have no need to involve court-related persons in the decisions regarding 
individual clients. Perhaps in some programs, courts exercise some minimal decision 
making involvement over clients referred to treatment, and yet have no input in decision 
making within treatment programs. Courts may order offenders into treatment, but 
require only those to individuals enroll in treatment. They may require some follow-up 
report or some notice of exit from the programs. Here, courts mandate treatment, but are 
not involved subsequently in decisions relating to the length of treatment or type of
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treatment. In this model, courts operate in the traditional role of courts and confine their 
activities to legal processing and decisions. Offenders may return, either as a result of 
some violation of imposed conditions or for new criminal charges. In the extreme cases, 
clients may be responsible for finding and enrolling in treatment programs without any 
help or guidance from courts.
Frequency of contact and degree of formality also may be related to the level o f  
control that court personnel have over treatment programs. Control is expressed as the 
use of formal, coercive authority by court personnel. In this dimension, courts utilize their 
coercive authority as part of a problem-solving strategy. Courts could maintain control 
over clients in drug treatment through the threat of imposing criminal sanctions. This 
control may be extended to drug treatment programs as well. In this thesis, there are two 
measures for the level o f  control. First, control refers to the ability of court personnel to 
recommend release or to influence the release of a client from treatment13 Second, 
control refers also to the power of court personnel to authorize the release of clients from 
treatment.14
13 For example, a public defender in a pretrial court-enforced drug treatment program is satisfied with the 
progress that a defendant has made in treatment. The public defender may formally recommend to the 
court that the client be released from drug treatment and the threat of prosecution under the current 
charges. However, if the prosecutor disagrees with the public defender, she may recommend that the 
defendant remain in drug treatment for another six months. All of this clearly extends the roles of both 
defense and prosecution lawyers.
14 In this same scenario, the drug treatment counselor may agree that client has made good progress in 
treatment, but recommends that the client continue with weekly counseling sessions and weekly drug 
testing for at least three more months. Here, only the judge has the power to authorize the release of the 
client from drug treatment. The structure of the pretrial program also gives the judge the power to 
authorize the clearing criminal charges against the client once he has successfully completed the court- 
enforced program. As a compromise, the judge may order the client to continue in treatment, including 
weekly counseling and weekly drug testing for another four months.
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Courts also can extend their authority into treatment programs through decisions 
that may affect certain aspects of treatment programming. This extension of court 
authority into drug treatment can be indicated by the incorporation of court-related goals, 
objectives, and standard procedures into drug treatment programs. In rational 
organizations, goals, and the actions by which they are achieved (i.e., objectives and 
procedures), provide the criteria for selecting courses of action (Scott, 1987). 
Furthermore, rational organizations can "coordinate" inter-organizational exchange 
through (Hall, 1987:255):
"...concerted decision-making or action in which in two or more organizations 
participate with some sort of deliberate adjustment to one another. A key factor here is 
the idea that the transactions are deliberate and involve a goal that is collective."
Deliberate and coordinated action between courts and drug treatment programs
that is aimed at the common goal of providing mandatory drug treatment for criminal
defendants is consistent with the principles above. A central aspect of this deliberate and
coordinated action, is the exchange of goals, objectives, and standard procedures on the
part of the involved organizations (Cooper and Trotter, 1994:96). This is the framework
for the relationship between courts and drug treatment programs. It also the basis for my
examinations of court-enforced drug treatment program relationships. My general
hypothesis concerning court-drug treatment relationships in as follows:
Courts are extending characteristics of formal, rational authority and 
bureaucratic organization to drug treatment programs through inter- 
organizational ties.
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More specifically, I hypothesize as follows:
1. The more frequent the contact between courts and drug treatment 
programs the more formal the relationship between the two organizations.
2. The more frequent and formal the organizational contact between courts and 
drug treatment programs, the higher the frequency o f involvement o f courts in 
drug treatment-related decisions; the greater the court control over the release of 
clients from drug treatment.
Generally, drug treatment programs that have more frequent and formal contact with 
court-related personnel are more likely to have court-related goals and objectives 
incorporated into drug treatment programming; and, court-related standard processes 
and procedures incorporated into standard drug treatment programming.
Methodology
The alliance between courts and drug treatment programs may have changed the 
manner in which both organizations pursue goals relative to the social control of drugs. 
This thesis attempts to describe the emergent court-treatment program relationship in the 
context of bureaucratized and rationalized social controls. Organizational theory and 
Weber's model of bureaucracy clarify the theoretical foundation of the research.
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I have attempted to triangulate data, drawing from relevant literature, examining 
court and drug treatment archival data, conducting on-site observations at several courts 
and drug treatment facilities, collected questionnaire data, and conducting interviews with 
relevant court and drug treatment staff.
The primary data come from a mail survey questionnaire (Appendix A) and follow- 
up telephone interviews. Data collection proceeded with the following two objectives in 
mind:
1. To describe the operation of drug treatment programs in relation to courts.
2. To examine the inter-organizational linkages between courts and drug 
treatment programs to determine the effects of these linkages on the 
structure and operation of and drug treatment programs.
The questionnaire focuses on drug treatment programs that provide services to 
clients that have been defendants in criminal court proceedings. The respondents are drug 
treatment professionals who manage these programs. The strategy for selecting and 
surveying prospective programs proceeded along two lines. First, I examined a list of 
agencies that provide treatment as a form of alternative sanction for drug defendants.
These programs included those that:
1. Are court initiated or developed;
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2. Operate within the administrative structure of a court (i.e., included in the court 
budget or under court supervision);
3. Treat clients who have been referred to drug treatment;
4. Provide courts with information about drug defendants (i.e., assessing, 
monitoring, reporting on the progress of treatment); and or
4. Operate in a court (or jail) environment.
This list was compiled through personal and professional contacts and accumulated 
through snow-ball procedures. Essentially, I began to brainstorm and ask colleagues for 
help in identifying those courts or jurisdictions that were using drug treatment programs or 
strategies to handle drug defendants. Those persons (n=83) who directed such programs 
were added to the list of prospective survey respondents.
The second group of prospects was selected from among the substance abuse 
treatment and non-treatment (e.g., assessment and referral, and education and prevention) 
programs listed in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) National 
Directory of Drug Abuse Treatment Programs (1992). This directory is published 
annually by the DHHS and is compiled to:
"...serve as a resource for program managers, treatment personnel, researchers, the 
Center for Substance Abuse Treatment Hotline, and others interested in the location and 
selected characteristics of alcoholism and drug abuse facilities."
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One hundred and thirty-four programs (n=134) were selected at random from the DHHS 
directory for the survey. Taken together, the two listings (Appendix B) provided a 
sample of two hundred and seventeen programs (217) with identified managers.
The questionnaire and a letter of explanation were mailed to those on the list at the 
end January, 1994. After three weeks, a follow-up letter was sent to those persons who 
had not responded. Two weeks later, a second follow-up letter was sent out.
In the middle of March, I began telephoning those treatment managers who had 
not responded. The telephone follow-ups were done for three purposes:
1. To ask if any staff member received the questionnaire in the mail. (If not, I 
offered to mail or to fax another copy of the survey.
2. To explain the purpose and context of the survey and to answer any 
questions concerning the survey, and finally;
3. To remove the anonymity from the survey by personalizing it through friendly 
and professional telephone conversation.
The telephone follow-ups significantly increased the survey response rate and by 
the April 30, 1994 survey return deadline, one hundred and twenty three (123) of the 
original two hundred and seventeen (217) questionnaires were completed and returned. 
Forty-seven (47) of those who were mailed questionnaires either declined to participate in 
the study or did not return their completed questionnaires by the deadline date.
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The final status of the remaining forty-seven (47) questionnaires is as follows:
1. Fourteen (14) were returned as undeliverable by postal service. The names or 
addresses were incorrect or unknown (in some of the cases, the drug treatment 
program had closed). An attempt was made to find a correct name and address for 
each of these dead-end cases; however, no forwarding or correct addresses could be 
found.
2. Twenty-six (26) were sent to persons who were not drug treatment professionals. 
Several of these individuals worked in programs that were closely linked to the drug 
treatment profession; however, neither they nor their agencies actually provided drug 
rehabilitation or treatment. A number of these persons worked for state commissions 
on drug abuse. Others worked in drug education and prevention programs that did 
not contain drug treatment components.
3. Seven (7) were later found to be duplicate addresses or programs that were 
inadvertently surveyed twice.
The total number of questionnaires from the three categories above (47) was 
subtracted from the sample N=217 to give an adjusted sample of 170. The final response 
rate was 72.4 percent. Data generated by questionnaire were analyzed using SPSS.
Chapter HI 
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
Bivariate Analysis: Cross Tabulations 
to Examine Key Relations and Questions
To begin to describe courts' involvement in drug treatment programs, treatment
providers were asked the following question:
How frequently does your program have on-going working relationships 
or administrative links with court, legislative, executive, or other criminal 
justice staff or agencies?1
Frequency o f contact with courts was measured by the following responses: daily, 
weekly, monthly, some,2 or never. Frequency of contacts between court-related personnel 
and drug treatment staff were scored from four (4) to zero (0).
Respondents also were asked to characterize their contacts with court-related 
personnel. Formality and informality were scored two (2) and one (1) respectively.
1 See question 15 in Appendix A.
2 A number of the respondents indicated contact with court-related personnel that was more frequent than 
Never and less frequent than Monthly. These respondents wrote in answers such as occasionally, rarely, 
quarterly, or less than monthly, but several times a year. Due to the significant number of these responses, 
an addition ordinal value of Some was created.
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Treatment programs that reported no contact with court-related personnel were scored as
zero (0) on this variable.
Are relationships (ties) form al (defined by statute, contract, or written 
agreement) or informal (defined by casual cooperation or verbal 
agreement)?17
Gamma was chosen as the statistical technique for evaluating the relationship 
among variables. This was due to gamma's stability, strength, and versatility in measuring 
the direction and degree of association between ordinal-level variables, including 
handling small and zero cell values (see Champion 1976:223).
The following tables present descriptions of the frequency of contacts among the 
treatment program staff and court-related personnel and the formality of those contacts. 
Table 1 suggests a very strong positive relationship between frequency of contact between 
judges and drug treatment staff, and the degree of formality of those contacts.18
17 See question 15 in Appendix A.
18 A gamma value measures the strength of association between two variables. A gamma of .70 or higher 
indicates a very strong relationship; .69 to .40 indicates a strong to moderate relationship; .40 to .0 
indicates a moderate to weak or no relationship. Some of the gamma values are influenced by the number 




FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH JUDGES BY 
FORMALITY OF TIES WITH JUDGES 
N=123, (32 or 26 % of the programs have no contact with Judges). 
Gamma = 0.93543
CONTACT BY FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW
FORMALITY 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 22 3 25
CONTACT 88.0 12.0 20.3
4
WEEKLY 14 5 19
CONTACT 73.7 26.3 15.4
3
MONTHLY 13 24 37
CONTACT 35.1 64.9 30.1
2
SOME 0.0 10 10
CONTACT 0.0 100.0 8.1
1
NO CONTACT 32 32
0 100.0 26.0
COLUMN TOTAL 49 42 32 123
39.8 34.1 26.0 100.0
34
Table 2
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PROBATION OFFICERS BY 
FORMALITY OF TEES WITH PROBATION OFFICERS 
N=123, (3 or 2.4 % of the programs have no contact with Probation Officers).
Gamma = 0.80620
CONTACT BY FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW
FORMALITY 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 46 6 52
CONTACT 88.5 11.5 42.3
4
WEEKLY 14 12 26
CONTACT 53.8 46.2 21.1
3
MONTHLY 12 23 35
CONTACT 34.3 65.7 28.5
2
SOME 0.0 7 7
CONTACT 0.0 100.0 5.7
1
NO CONTACT 3 3
0 100.0 2.4
COLUMN TOTAL 72 48 3 123
58.5 39.0 2.4 100.0
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Table 3
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF BY 
FORMALITY OF TIES WITH ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 
N=123, (3 4  or 27.6% of the programs have no contact with Administrative Staff).
Gamma = 0.91956
CONTACT BY FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW
FORMALITY 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 28 2 30
CONTACT 93.3 6.7 24.4
4
WEEKLY 14 12 26
CONTACT 53.8 46.2 21.1
3
MONTHLY 9 16 25
CONTACT 36.0 64.0 20.3
2
SOME 1 7 8
CONTACT 12.5 87.5 6.5
1
NO CONTACT 34 34
0 100.0 27.6
COLUMN TOTAL 52 37 34 123
42.3 30.1 27.6 100.0
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Table 4
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PUBLIC DEFENDERS BY 
FORMALITY OF TIES WITH PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
N=123, (39 or 31.7% of the programs have no contact with Public Defenders).
Gamma = 0.88901
CONTACT BY FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW
FORMALITY 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 18 9 27
CONTACT 66.7 33.3 22.0
4
WEEKLY 9 4 13
CONTACT 69.2 30.8 10.6
3
MONTHLY 10 28 38
CONTACT 26.3 73.7 30.9
2
SOME 1 5 6
CONTACT 16.7 83.3 4.9
1
NO CONTACT 39 39
0 100.0 31.7
COLUMN TOTAL 38 46 39 123
30.9 37.4 31.7 100.0
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Table 5
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PROSECUTORS BY 
FORMALITY OF TIES WITH PROSECUTORS 
N=123, (49 or 39.8% of the programs have no contact with Prosecutors).
Gamma = 0.94661
CONTACT BY FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW
FORMALITY 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 17 3 20
CONTACT 85.0 15.0 16.3
4
WEEKLY 13 4 17
CONTACT 76.5 23.5 13.8
3
MONTHLY 9 17 26
CONTACT 34.6 65.4 21.1
2
SOME 1 10 11
CONTACT 9.1 90.9 8.9
1
NO CONTACT 49 49
0 100.0 39.8
COLUMN TOTAL 40 34 49 123
32.5 27.6 39.8 100.0
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Tables 2 to 5 report findings concerning the relationship between frequency of 
contact and formality that are highly consistent across court personnel roles. Frequency of 
interaction also may be related to the formal authority that courts exercise over drug 
treatment program decisions.
Court personnel involvement in drug treatment decisions also was measured by 
frequency: daily, weekly, monthly, some, and never. Court personnel involvement in 
drug treatment decisions also was scored from four (4) to zero (0).19 Tables 6 to 10 
present the results. The data suggest a strong positive relationship between frequency of 
contact between court personnel and drug treatment staff and the frequency with which 
court personnel are involved in drug treatment program decision making.20
19 See question 24 in Appendix A.
20 Some of the gamma values are influenced by the number of "No Invlmnt" programs; however, the 
strength of the relationship without these programs is relatively unchanged
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Table 6
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH JUDGES BY 
FREQUENCY OF INVOLVEMENT (INVLMNT) OF JUDGES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 


































































































FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PROBATION OFFICERS BY 
FREQUENCY OF INVOLVEMENT (INVLMNT) OF PROBATION OFFICERS IN
TREATMENT DECISIONS 
N=123, (3 or 2.4 % of the programs have no contact with Probation Officers).
Gamma = 0.48521
CONTACT BY DAILY WEEKLY MONTHLY SOME NO ROW
INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT TOTAL
4 3 2 1 0
DAILY 18 9 8 3 14 52
CONTACT 34.6 17.3 15.4 5.8 26.9 42.3
4
WEEKLY 1 6 7 1 11 26
CONTACT 3.8 23.1 26.9 3.8 42.3 21.1
3
MONTHLY 2 16 17 35
CONTACT 5.7 45.7 48.6 28.5
2
SOME 1 1 5 7
CONTACT
1




COLUMN 19 18 32 4 50 123
TOTAL 15.4 14.6 26.0 3.3 40.7 100.0
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Table 8
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH COURT ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF BY FREQUENCY OF 
INVOLVEMENT (INVLMNT) OF COURT ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF IN TREATMENT
DECISIONS


























































































FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PUBLIC DEFENDERS BY 
FREQUENCY OF INVOLVEMENT (INVLMNT) OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN TREATMENT
DECISIONS
N=123, (39 or 31.7% of the programs have no contact with Public Defenders).
Gamma = 0.60284
CONTACT BY DAILY WEEKLY MONTHLY SOME NO ROW
INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT TOTAL
4 3 2 1 0
DAILY 4 2 4 17 27
CONTACT 14.8 7.4 14.8 63.0 22.0
4
WEEKLY 3 2 1 7 13
CONTACT 23.1 15.4 7.7 53.8 10.6
3
MONTHLY 1 11 26 38
CONTACT 2.6 28.9 68.4 30.9
2







COLUMN 5 5 17 2 94 123
TOTAL 4.1 4.1 13.8 1.6 76.4 100.0
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Table 10
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PROSECUTORS BY 
FREQUENCY OF INVOLVEMENT (INVLMNT) OF PROSECUTORS IN
TREATMENT DECISIONS 
N=123, (49 or 39.8% of the programs have no contact with Prosecutors).
Gamma = 0.63821
CONTACT BY DAILY WEEKLY MONTHLY SOME NO ROW
INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT INVLMNT TOTAL
4 3 2 1 0
DAILY 2 1 2 1 14 20
CONTACT 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 70.0 16.3
4
WEEKLY 3 2 2 10 17
CONTACT 17.6 11.8 11.8 58.8 13.8
3
MONTHLY 5 1 20 26
CONTACT 19.2 3.8 76.9 ' 21.1
2







COLUMN 2 4 9 6 102 123
TOTAL 1.6 3.3 7.3 4.9 82.9 100.0
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Frequency of contact also may be related to the level o f  control that court 
personnel have over their relationship with drug treatment programs. Control is expressed 
as the use of coercive authority by court personnel. Does this control extend into drug 
treatment programs? In court-enforced drug treatment, control is expressed ultimately 
through the power to keep individuals in or release them from drug treatment programs. 
Two levels of control can be described. First, control refers to the ability of court 
personnel to recommend or to influence the release of clients from treatment. Second, 
control refers also to the power of court personnel to authorize the release of clients from 
treatment.
Drug treatment staff were asked about the level of control that court personnel had 
over the release of clients from their treatment programs. Responses were scored two (2) 
when court personnel had the power to authorize the release of clients from treatment, 
one (1) where court personnel could merely recommend the release of a client from 
treatment, and zero (0) where neither was possible.21 Tables 11 to 15 present the results 
of these analyses. Again, the results indicate a moderate to strong relationship between 
frequency of contact between drug treatment staff and court personnel, and the level of 
control that court personnel have over the release of clients from drug treatment 
programs.
21 See question 23 in Appendix A.
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Table 11
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH JUDGES BY 
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF JUDGES 
N=123, (32 or 26 % of the programs have no contact with Judges). 
Gamma = 0.63956
CONTACT BY NO
RELEASE AUTHORIZE RECOMMEND CONTROL ROW
CONTROL 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 16 9 25
CONTACT 64.0 36.0 20.3
4
WEEKLY 12 1 6 19
CONTACT 63.2 5.3 31.6 15.4
3
MONTHLY 14 5 18 37
CONTACT 37.8 13.5 48.6 30.1
2
SOME 4 1 5 10





COLUMN TOTAL 46 7 70 123
37.4 5.7 56.9 100.0
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Table 12
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PROBATION OFFICERS BY 
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF PROBATION OFFICERS 
N=123, (3 or 2.4 % of the programs have no contact with Probation Officers).
Gamma = 0.44629
CONTACT BY NO
RELEASE AUTHORIZE RECOMMEND CONTROL ROW
CONTROL 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 17 17 18 52
CONTACT 32.7 32.7 34.6 42.3
4
WEEKLY 5 8 13 26
CONTACT 19.2 30.8 50.0 21.1
3
MONTHLY 4 7 24 35
CONTACT 11.4 20.0 68.6 28.5
2
SOME 1 1 5 7





COLUMN TOTAL 27 33 63 123
22.0 26.8 51.2 100.0
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Table 13
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF BY 
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 
N=123, (34 or 21.6% of the programs have no contact with Administrative staff)*
Gamma = 0.41509
CONTACT BY NO
RELEASE AUTHORIZE RECOMMEND CONTROL ROW
CONTROL 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 4 3 23 30
CONTACT 13.3 10.0 76.7 24.4
4
WEEKLY 6 20 26
CONTACT 23.1 76.9 21.1
3
MONTHLY 3 4 18 25
CONTACT 12.0 16.0 72.0 20.3
2
SOME 1 7 8





COLUMN TOTAL 7 14 102 123
5.7 11.4 82.9 100.0
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Table 14
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PUBLIC DEFENDERS BY 
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
N=123, (39 or 31.7% of the programs have no contact with Public Defenders).
Gamma = 0.60775 ___
CONTACT BY NO
RELEASE AUTHORIZE RECOMMEND CONTROL ROW
CONTROL 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 2 8 17 27
CONTACT 7.4 29.6 63.0 22.0
4
WEEKLY 5 8 13
CONTACT 38.5 61.5 10.6
3
MONTHLY 14 24 38








COLUMN TOTAL 2 27 94 123
1.6 22.0 76.4 100.0
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Table 15
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH PROSECUTORS BY 
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF PROSECUTORS 
N=123, (49 or 39.8% of the programs have no contact with Prosecutors).
Gamma = 0.65045
CONTACT BY NO
RELEASE AUTHORIZE RECOMMEND CONTROL ROW
CONTROL 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 5 4 11 20
CONTACT 25.0 20.0 55.0 16.3
4
WEEKLY 1 4 12 17
CONTACT 5.9 23.5 70.6 13.8
3
MONTHLY 7 19 26
CONTACT 26.9 73.1 21.1
2
SOME 4 7 11





COLUMN TOTAL 6 19 98 123
4.9 15.4 79.7 100.0
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Do court personnel with more frequent involvement in drug treatment decisions 
also have more formalized ties with drug treatment programs? Tables 16 to 20 examine 
this relationship. The results indicate a strong correlation between frequency of court 
personnel involvement in drug treatment decisions and formality of ties.
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Table 16
JUDGES* FREQUENCY OF INVOLVEMENT IN TREATMENT 
DECISIONS BY FORMALITY OF TIES WITH JUDGES 
N=123, (32 or 26 % of the programs have no contact with Judges). 
Gamma = 0.76214
INVOLVEMENT FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW
BY FORMALITY 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 8 2 10
INVOLVEMENT 80.0 20.0 8.1
4
WEEKLY 10 1 11
INVOLVEMENT 90.9 9.1 8.9
3
MONTHLY 9 8 17
INVOLVEMENT 52.9 47.1 13.8
2




NO 18 28 32 78
INVOLVEMENT 23.1 35.9 41.0 63.4
0
COLUMN TOTAL 49 42 32 123
39.8 34.1 26.0 100.0
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Table 17
PROBATION OFFICERS FREQUENCY OF INVOLVEMENT IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 
BY FORMALITY OF TIES WITH PROBATION OFFICERS 
N=123, (3 or 2.4 % of the programs have no contact with Probation Officers).
Gamma = 0.56444
INVOLVEMENT FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW
BY FORMALITY 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 18 1 19
INVOLVEMENT 94.7 5.3 15.4
4
WEEKLY 12 6 18
INVOLVEMENT 66.7 33.3 14.6
3
MONTHLY 20 12 32
INVOLVEMENT 62.5 37.5 26.0
2




NO 20 27 3 50
INVOLVEMENT 40.0 54.0 6.0 40.7
0
COLUMN TOTAL 72 48 3 123
58.5 39.0 2.4 100.0
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Table 18
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF FREQUENCY OF INVOLVEMENT IN TREATMENT 
DECISIONS BY FORMALITY OF TIES WITH ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 
N=123, (3 4  or 27.6% of the programs have no contact with Administrative staff).
Gamma = 0.60972
INVOLVEMENT FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW




WEEKLY 3 1 4
INVOLVEMENT 75.0 25.0 3.3
3
MONTHLY 4 4 8
INVOLVEMENT 50.0 50.0 6.5
2
SOME 1 1 2
INVOLVEMENT 50.0 50.0 1.6
I
NO 40 31 34 105
INVOLVEMENT 38.1 29.5 32.4 85.4
0
COLUMN TOTAL 52 37 34 123
42.3 30.1 27.6 100.0
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Table 19
PUBLIC DEFENDERS FREQUENCY OF INVOLVEMENT IN TREATMENT 
DECISIONS BY FORMALITY OF TIES WITH PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
N=123, (39 or 31.7% of the programs have no contact with Public Defenders).
Gamma = 0.71854
INVOLVEMENT FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW
BY FORMALITY 2 1 0 TOTAL
DAILY 4 1 5
INVOLVEMENT 80.0 20.0 4.1
4
WEEKLY 3 2 5
INVOLVEMENT 60.0 40.0 4.1
3
MONTHLY 9 8 17
INVOLVEMENT 52.9 47.1 13.8
2
SOME 1 1 2
INVOLVEMENT 50.0 50.0 1.6
1
NO 21 34 39 94
INVOLVEMENT 22.3 36.2 41.5 76.4
0
COLUMN TOTAL 38 46 39 123
30.9 37.4 31.7 100.0
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Table 20
PROSECUTORS FREQUENCY OF INVOLVEMENT IN TREATMENT 
DECISIONS BY FORMALITY OF TIES WITH PROSECUTORS 
N=123, (49 or 39.8% of the programs have no contact with Prosecutors).
Gamma = 0.67509
INVOLVEMENT FORMAL TIES INFORMAL TIES NO TIES ROW







MONTHLY 3 6 9
INVOLVEMENT 33.3 66.7 7.3
2
SOME 3 3 6
INVOLVEMENT 50.0 50.0 4.9
1
NO 28 25 49 102
INVOLVEMENT 27.5 24.5 48.0 82.9
0
COLUMN TOTAL 40 34 49 123
32.5 27.6 39.8 100.0
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Is there a relationship between formality of ties and the control that court 
personnel have to release clients from treatment? The cross-tabulated results are 
represented in Tables 21 to 25. The results indicate a moderate to strong positive 
relationship between formality of ties and level of control.
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Table 21
FORMALITY OF TIES WITH JUDGES BY  
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF JUDGES 
N=123, (32 or 26% of the programs have no relationship with Judges).
Gamma = 0.70253
FORMALITY BY NO
RELEASE AUTHORIZE RECOMMEND CONTROL ROW
CONTROL 2 1 0 TOTAL
FORMAL 29 2 18 49
TIES 59.2 4.1 36.7 39.8
2
INFORMAL 17 5 20 42





COLUMN TOTAL 46 7 70 123
37.4 5.7 56.9 100.0
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Table 22
FORMALITY OF TIES WITH PROBATION OFFICERS BY 
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF PROBATION OFFICERS 
N=123, (32 or 26 % of the programs have no relationship with Probation Officers).
Gamma = 0.56757 ___
FORMALITY BY NO
RELEASE AUTHORIZE RECOMMEND CONTROL ROW
CONTROL 2 1 0 TOTAL
FORMAL 22 23 27 72
TIES 30.6 31.9 37.5 58.5
2
INFORMAL 5 10 33 48





COLUMN TOTAL 27 33 63 123
22.0 26.8 51.2 100.0
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Table 23
FORMALITY OF TIES WITH ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF BY 
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 
N=123, (32 or 26 % of the programs have no relationship with Administrative staff)*
Gamma = 0.50000
FORMALITY BY NO
RELEASE AUTHORIZE RECOMMEND CONTROL ROW
CONTROL 2 1 0 TOTAL
FORMAL 6 6 40 52
TIES 11.5 11.5 76.9 42.3
2
INFORMAL 1 8 28 37





COLUMN TOTAL 7 14 102 123
5.7 11.4 82.9 100.0
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Table 24
FORMALITY OF TIES WITH PUBLIC DEFENDERS BY 
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
N=123, (32 or 26 % of the programs have no relationship with Public Defenders).













FORMAL 2 15 21 38
TIES 5.3 39.5 55.3 30.9
2
INFORMAL 12 34 46





COLUMN TOTAL 2 27 94 123
1.6 22.0 76.4 100.0
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Table 25
FORMALITY OF TIES WITH PROSECUTORS BY  
LEVEL OF CONTROL OF PROSECUTORS 
N=123, (32 or 26 % of the programs have no relationship with Prosecutors).
Gamma = 0.77203
FORMALITY BY NO
RELEASE AUTHORIZE RECOMMEND CONTROL ROW
CONTROL 2 1 0 TOTAL
FORMAL 6 10 24 40
TIES 15.0 25.0 60.0 32.5
2
INFORMAL 9 25 34





COLUMN TOTAL 6 19 98 123
4.9 15.4 79.7 100.0
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Univariate Analysis:
Frequency Distributions and Possible Implications
The survey results indicate that frequency of contact and formality of ties are 
central to the nature of the relationship between courts and drug treatment programs . 
Furthermore, frequency and formality are closely related to other aspects of court-drug 
treatment program relationships (i.e., court involvement in treatment decisions, and court 
control over the release of clients from treatment). The results also suggest a significant 
extension of court authority into drug treatment organizations.
Further evidence of the extension of court authority into drug treatment is 
indicated by the substantial number of drug treatment staff stating that they have 
incorporated criminal justice goals, objectives, and standard procedures into their own 
goals, objectives, and procedures. These results are presented in frequency distribution 
tables below. Table 26 presents the number of drug treatment programs where staff have 
incorporated goals that are aimed at general criminal justice issues into their treatment 
strategies. Tables 27 to 32 present treatment staff responses for goals aimed at more 
specific criminal justice issues, (post-arrest, pretrial, pre-sentencing, post-sentencing, 
probation, and parole).12 For example, drug treatment programs that handle only pre-trail 
drug defendants tend to incorporate goals that are aimed at treating clients who, generally, 
have less severe drug-addiction problems. According to Chaiken and Johnson, these
22 See question 25 in Appendix A.
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individuals tend to be occasional users, whose drug involvement and associated behavioral 
problems are characterized by (1988:4):23
1. Typical drug use [that is] light to moderate or single-substance, such as alcohol, marijuana, 
cocaine, or combination use.
2. Driving under the influence [and] lowered work productivity.
3. Little to no contact with the criminal justice system.
These clients tend to be first-offenders, and generally, do not have severe drug addiction 
problems. Conversely, a parole oriented program is more likely to incorporate goals that 
are aimed at treating clients who tend to have more severe drug addiction and behavioral 
problems. Chaiken and Johnson also note that these drug offenders generally (1988:6):24
1. Engage in moderate to heavy drug use; often [with] addiction to heroin and cocaine use.
2. Commit many crimes in periods of heaviest drug use including robberies; major source of 
income from criminal activity; low status roles in drug hierarchy.
3. [Have] high contact with criminal justice system; [and,] high incarceration.
23 This profile is taken from Chaiken and Johnson's (1988) manuscript, Characteristics o f Different 
Types o f Drug Involved Offenders.
24 This profile is based from Chaiken and Johnson's (1988) manuscript, Characteristics o f Different 
Types o f Drug Involved Offenders.
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DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS THAT 
HAVE INCORPORATED CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE GOALS INTO DRUG GOALS
Table 26 
N=123
GOALS AIMED AT RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE
GENERAL JUDICIAL PERCENT
ISSUES
YES 76 61.8 61.8
1
NO 47 38.2 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
Table 27 
N=123





NO 93 75.6 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
Table 28 
N=123





NO 80 65.0 100.0
0










NO 90 73.2 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
Table 30  
N=123






NO 85 69.1 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
Table 31 
N=123





NO 60 48.8 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
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Table 32  
N=123





NO 85 69.1 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
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Drug treatment staff were asked about other criminal justice objectives,
(accelerated case disposition, case backlog reduction, sentencing alternatives, and 
reducing corrections overcrowding).25 Responses were coded two (2) when identified as 
a primary objective, one (1) when identified as secondary, and zero (0) where neither was 
indicated. Tables 33 to 36 present these results.
25 See question 19 in Appendix A.
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE OBJECTIVES 
INCORPORATED INTO 
DRUG TREATM ENT PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
Table 33 
N=123
ACCELERATED CASE RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE
DISPOSITION PERCENT





NOT APPLICABLE 84 68.3 100.0
0




















SENTENCING RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE
ALTERNATIVES PERCENT
PRIMARY 37 30.1 30.1
2
SECONDARY 36 29.3 59.3
1
NOT APPLICABLE 50 40.7 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.0
Table 36 
N=123
REDUCE JAIL RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE
OVERCROWDING PERCENT





NOT APPLICABLE 61 49.6 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.0
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Drug treatment staff also were questioned about standard criminal justice 
procedures that have been incorporated into their drug treatment programs. For example, 
creating or updating the criminal history of defendants is a standard part of maintaining 
court and arrest records. Drug treatment programs that are part of court-enforced 
treatment programs may tend to maintain records on the criminal history and substance 
abuse history of clients. There are drug treatment programs that are structured to handle 
court-enforced treatment clients whose physical whereabouts must be monitored (e.g., 
judges may order clients to stay away from known drug trafficking areas). Also, if court- 
enforced treatment clients do not comply with court orders, they may be incarcerated; 
therefore, some drug treatment programs may be structured to deal with clients who are in 
jail. It may be common also for court-enforced programs to have standard eligibility 
criteria that defendants must meet in order to receive drug treatment. Some courts allow 
only defendants who are facing non-violent, misdemeanor drug possession charges to 
participate in court-enforced treatment programs. Other courts, such as those that have 
pretrial diversionary programs, may require defendants to waive certain constitutional 
rights (e.g., the right to a trial) in exchange for participation in drug treatment. Typically, 
this type of court-enforced program drops criminal charges against defendants after they 
successfully complete drug treatment. Courts also may require their drug treatment 
partners to provide standardized reports on defendants such as drug testing results. These 
reports help courts monitor the compliance of defendants with treatment-related 
guidelines. Finally, courts may require defendants to satisfy other standard guidelines or
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stipulations as conditions of release from court-enforced treatment. Tables 37 to 44 
present the results on the incorporation of the above standard criminal justice/court related 
components, (i.e., standard review o f criminal record/history, standard monitoring o f 
clients, standard incarceration o f clients, standard court-related eligibility criteria for  
participation in program, standard waiving o f their constitution rights/granting consent, 
standard progress reports, standard drug testing, and standard criteria for release o f 
clients from treatment) into standard drug treatment program procedures.26
26 See question 20 in Appendix A.
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURES 
INCORPORATED INTO 
DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAM PROCEDURES
Table 37 
N=123





NO 47 38.2 100.0
0
TOTALS 323 100.0 100.00
Table 38  
N=123
MONITORING RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE
PERCENT
YES 39 61.8 61.8
1
NO 47 38.2 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
Table 39 
N=123
INCARCERATION RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE
PERCENT
YES 10 8.1 8.1
1
NO 113 91.9 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
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Table 40  
N=123
ELIGIBILITY RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE
CRITERIA PERCENT
YES 30 24.4 24.4
1
NO 93 75.6 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
Table 41 
N=123
CLIENT WAIVES RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE
RIGHTS PERCENT
YES 43 35.0 35.0
1
NO 80 65.0 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
Table 42  
N=123
DRUG TESTING RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE
PERCENT
YES 33 26.8 26.8
1
NO 90 73.2 100.0
0




PROGRESS RESPONSES PERCENT CUMULATIVE




NO 85 69.1 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
Table 44  
N=123





NO 60 48.8 100.0
0
TOTALS 123 100.0 100.00
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The results of these analyses suggest that criminal justice goals, objectives, and 
other standard criminal justice or court-related procedures have become incorporated into 
some of drug treatment programs. We have seen the association between frequency and 
formality (Hage and Aiken, 1969; Hall, 1987). Are there any measurable associations 
between drug treatment program frequency and formality of contact with courts and drug 
treatment program goals, objective, and procedures? Do drug treatment staff who have 
frequent and formal contact with courts also tend to incorporate criminal justice goals, 
objectives, and procedures into the structure of their treatment programs? The next 
section will examine these issues.
Broader Implication of Frequency and
Formality on Other Drug Treatment Program Characteristics
Analyses to this point suggest that measures of association concerning frequency 
o f contact and formality o f contact with drug treatment programs are consistent across 
court-related personnel roles. Analyses from this point will focus on judges rather them 
other court-related personnel. That is, I will focus on judges because they have the 
primary criminal justice role. Tauber (1994:17) provides a useful summary:
Judges are in a unique position to provide effective leadership in promoting coordinated 
drug control and treatment efforts, both within the criminal justice system and in their 
local communities. Judges have the political influence, the ties to government agencies, 
the moral authority, the perceived fairness and impartiality, and the expertise and focus 
necessary to bring leadership to coordinated anti-drug efforts.
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Survey responses regarding frequency and formality of contact with judges were 
compressed into a new frequency and formality interaction term: FF. Table 45 shows the 
clustering of the drug treatment programs sampled according to the formality of contact 
with judges. Each of the formality clusters was then assigned an ordinal value for FF. 
Drug treatment programs with formal ties to judges (n=49) were assigned a value of 2. 
Programs with informal ties to judges (n=42) were assigned a value of 1. Those drug 
treatment programs with no ties to judges (n=32) were given a value of 0.
Using formality as a basis for clustering the sample population is based on its 
relationship to frequency as set forth in previous analyses (Tables 1-5). These analyses 
show a very strong positive relationship between drug treatment program frequency of 
contact with courts and the degree of formality of contact with courts. Proceeding with 
further analyses by clustering the sample population according to formality of contact with 
courts is conceptually consistent with previous analyses: according to drug treatment 
program frequency of contact with courts.
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Table 45
CLUSTERING OF DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS 













This section examines the relationships between FF and the incorporation of court- 
related goals, objectives, and procedures into drug treatment program structures and 
processes. The questions remain the same:
1. To what degree do court structures and processes influence the structures and 
processes of drug treatment programs?
2. Do court-related personnel with more frequent and more formal relationships 
with drug treatment programs also have more influence over the goals, objectives, 
and procedures those drug treatment programs?
The survey results suggest that drug treatment programs are related to courts in 
different ways and in varying degrees. Generally, the pattern persists: the more closely 
court staff are related to courts the more likely they are to be involved in drug treatment 
program structures and processes.
Table 46 presents the results on the relationship between FF and criminal justice- 
related goals.27 Table 47 presents the results between FF and court-related objectives.28 
Criminal justice-related objectives that were identified as primary or secondary drug 
treatment program objectives were recoded as one (1). If neither was indicated, it was 
coded zero (0). Table 48 presents the results between FF and criminal justice-related
27 Coding of responses for court-related goals (i.e., post-arrest, pretrial, pre-sentencing, post-sentencing, 
probation, and parole) was unchanged.
28 Court-related objectives included, accelerated case disposition, case backlog reduction, sentencing 
alternatives, and reducing corrections overcrowding.
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standard procedures.29 Tables 46 to 48 suggest that there is a positive, moderate 
relationship between FF and the aforementioned drug treatment program characteristics.
29 Coding of responses for court-related standard procedures (i.e., standard review of criminal 
record/history, standard monitoring o f clients, standard incarceration o f clients, standard court-related 
eligibility criteria for participation in program, standard waiving of their constitution rights/granting 
consent, standard progress reports, standard drug testing, and standard criteria for release of clients 
from treatment) was unchanged.
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DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAM 
FORMALITY (FF) OF CONTACT WITH JUDGES 
BY INCORPORATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE-RELATED GOALS (CJG) 
INTO DRUG TREATMENT GOALS
Table 46 
(Gamma=0.50115)
FFBY CJG CJG ROW
CJG YES (1) NO (0) TOTAL
FF 43 6 49
2 87.8 12.2 39.8
FF 27 15 42
1 64.3 35.7 34.1
FF 18 14 32
0 56.3 43.8 26.0
TOTALS 88 35 123
71.5 28.5 100.0
DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAM 
FORMALITY (FF) OF CONTACT 
WITH JUDGES BY INCORPORATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE-RELATED OBJECTIVES (CJO) 
INTO DRUG TREATMENT OBJECTIVES
Table 47 
(Gamma=0.55917)
FFBY CJO CJO ROW
CJO YES (1) NO (0) TOTALS
FF 39 10 49
2 79.6 20.4 39.8
FF 30 12 42
1 71.4 28.6 34.1
FF 11 21 32
0 34.4 65.5 26.0
TOTALS 80 43 123
65.0 35.0 100.0
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DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAM 
FORMALITY (FF) OF CONTACT 
WITH JUDGES BY INCORPORATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE-RELATED PROCEDURES (CJP) 
INTO DRUG TREATMENT PROCEDURES
Table 48 
(Gamma=0.57082)
FFBY CJP CJP ROW
CJP YES (1) NO (0) TOTAL
FF 47 2 49
2 95.5 4.1 39.8
FF 39 3 42
1 92.9 7.1 34.1
FF 25 7 32
0 78.1 21.9 26.0




This represents a first attempt to examine the relationship between courts and drug 
treatment programs in terms of consequences for drug treatment agencies. However, 
there is a proliferation of court-oriented research emerging from a variety of court, 
government, academic, and even media institutions. The results of this thesis support a 
relationship between increasing frequent and formal contact between courts and drug 
treatment programs and the increasing influence that courts have over the management 
and operations of drug treatment programs. This is highly consistent with research on 
organizations generally.
The process of bureaucratization is more complex than can be captured through 
the variables I examined here. Bureaucratization is not a unidimensional concept. It 
includes a number of different factors such as routinization, formalization, specialization, 
and standardization. These concepts are reflected more or less fully by the variables 
contained in the study. Defining and measuring bureaucratization seemed simple enough 
in the initial stages of the study. However, combining the variables to measure 
bureaucratization as a unitary concept proved too complex and the data were not
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adequate. I found that I was unable to take the several measures of the several dimensions 
and combine them into a single measure of bureaucratization. Individual measures of 
bureaucratization are not necessarily additive, nor are they necessarily linear. For 
example, a highly specialized court-drug treatment program relationship doesn't 
necessarily mean that the involved drug treatment program is highly oriented toward 
court-related standard procedures. Specialization, does not necessarily mean more 
standardization.
What this study accomplished was an examination of several dimensions of court 
bureaucratization of drug treatment programs presented. More research is needed to 
define and measure the various dimensions of bureaucratization as it relates to inter- 
organizational relationships. Such research is necessary for understanding inter- 
organizational relationships generally and the consequences of court-drug treatment 
program relationships more specifically.
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APPENDIX A. Questionnaire30
IDENTIFICATION (for contact purposes only)
Name of person responding to survey/ Title
Program Name
Street Address
City State Zip Code
County Telephone No. Ext. (if any)
1. Does your program distinguish between drug-dependent offenders and other drug- 
dependent voluntary clients in implementing treatment strategies?
Yes □  No □
2. If yes, estimate the percentage of clients who are presently participating in your 
treatment program under some form of judicial order or court supervision, (including 
probation or court monitoring program).
(Estimate the percentage, 0%-100%)
3. What is the average number of judicially-ordered or court-supervised clients 
participating in your program during a one month period (estimate, if necessary)?
30 One of the primary lesson that I gained from this thesis exercise was how to build a better survey 
instrument. In retrospect, I tried to gather too much information. I also learned to carefully plan my 
survey instrument in terms of data analysis as well. In addition, I used only a fraction of the data that I 
gathered for my thesis. The format of this questionnaire has been altered for publication in this thesis.
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4. Is your program structured to address the needs of a specific population (e.g., dually 
diagnosed females, young black males, suburban youth)?
Yes □  No □
(If yes, briefly describe or list the target population(s):
5. What type(s) of substance abuse problem(s) does your program address? (Check 
appropriate boxes.)
Cocaine □ Amphetamines □
Crack □ Barbiturates □
Heroin □ Hallucinogens □




6. What treatment approaches or modalities are utilized in your program? (Check 
appropriate boxes.)
Detoxification □ Counseling and Therapy □
Pharmacological maintenance □ Acupuncture □
(e.g., Methadone, Naltrexone) Intervention (e.g., family) □
Physical Control (e.g., confinement) □ Other(s) □
Monitoring (e.g., probation, random □ (Specify)
drug testing, electronic device)
7. Please describe the type and length of each phase or stage of your treatment program 







8. Briefly describe the overall management structure of your program by departments: 
(e.g., detoxification, counseling, and supervision departments and the program director 
oversees all of these departments). Alternatively, if available, may we have a copy of your 
organizational chart?
9. Where is your program located? (Check appropriate boxes.):
Outpatient Facility □  Community Mental Health Center □
Residential Facility □  Halfway House/Recovery Home □
Hospital (Including VA Hospitals) □  Other □
(Specify)__________________________
10. What geographic area is served by your program? (Check appropriate box.) 
Serves one county/jurisdiction □  Serves the entire state □
Serves two counties/jurisdictions □  Other □
Serves three or more counties/jurisdictions □  Specify___________________
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11. In the following table, please indicate the number of staff or personnel working in 
your program according to their educational disciplines and training or credentials. Please 
distinguish between full-time and part-time staff, and full-time and part-time volunteer 
personnel:
Staff/Personnel Positions Number of Full- 
Time Paid Staff
Number of Part- 
Time Paid Staff
Number of Full- 
Time 
Volunteers
Number of Part- 
Time 
Volunteers
Executive (e.g., Program Director)
Psychologists (Master's Level and Above)
Social Workers (Master's and Above)
Other Professional Counselors 
(Credentialed and/or Counseling Degree)
Social Workers (Bachelor's and Below)






Administrative Staff (e.g., secretaries, 
receptionists)
Other (Please Specify)
12. Does your program charge clients personally for treatment services (i.e., fees that are 
not reimbursable by insurance or government fees)?
Yes □  No □
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13. Does your program charge and receive any reimbursed fees? (If yes, check 
appropriate boxes.)
Yes □  No □
Federal Government Reimbursed Fees □  
State Government Reimbursed Fees □  
Court Reimbursed Fees □
Local Government Reimbursed Fees □  
Private Insurance Reimbursed Fees □  
Other □
(Specify)________________________
14. Does your program receive any public or private program grants or support? (If yes, 
check appropriate boxes.)
Yes □  No □
Federal Government Grants □ Private Grants/Donations □
State Government Grants □ Court Grants □
Local Government Grants □ Court-Controlled Grants/Funds □
Other □
(Specify)
15, How frequently does your program have on-going working relationships or 
administrative links with court, legislative, executive, or other criminal justice staff or 
agencies? Are relationships (ties) formal (defined by statute, contract, or written 
agreement) or informal (defined by casual cooperation or verbal agreement)?
(Check appropriate boxes.)
Type of RelationshipFrequency of Contact
Never 
Judges □  
Court 
Staff □  
Probation 






















□ □ □ □ □
Briefly describe the nature of the relationships noted above (e.g., judge reviews clients' 






17. Has working with drug-dependent offenders or other court-monitored clients in any 
way changed the structure or operation of your treatment program?
Yes □  No □
If yes, briefly describe how your program has changed:
18. Has working with courts or court-related personnel in any way changed the structure 
or operation of your treatment program?
Yes □  No □
If yes, briefly describe how your program has changed:
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19. Please indicate the objectives of your program by checking the appropriate boxes 
below. Are these primary objectives (i.e., part of overall goals of your program) or are 
they secondary benefits (i.e., additional advantages resulting from the pursuit of specific 
objectives)?
Intensive Intervention
Primary □ Secondary □ Not Applicable □
Drug Demand Reduction
Primary □ Secondary □ Not Applicable □
Drug treatment and prevention
Primary □ Secondary □ Not Applicable □
Rehabilitation
Primary □ Secondary □ Not Applicable □
Accelerated Drug Case Dispositions
Primary □ Secondary □ Not Applicable □
Case Backlog Reduction
Primary □ Secondary □ Not Applicable □
Sentencing Alternatives
Primary □ Secondary □ Not Applicable □
Reduce Corrections Overcrowding
Primary □ Secondary □ Not Applicable □
Other (Specifv)
Primary □ Secondary □ Not Applicable □
20. Does your program use standard program procedures or components for all clients to 
accomplish treatment objectives (e.g., all clients are drug tested by urinalysis, all clients 
undergo detoxification)?
Yes □  No: Each Client Given Personalized/Individualized Program. □
(If yes, check all components that are standard program procedures for all clients in your 
program.)
Detoxification □  Drug Testing/Urinalysis □
Formal Client Eligibility Criteria □  Acupuncture □
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Client Criminal History Review □  Treatment Progress Review □
Client Waives Rights/Gives Consent □  Formal Release from Program □
Counseling/Therapy □  Other □
(Specify)________________________
21. Does your program utilize administrative manuals, policies, or guidelines for 
accomplishing treatment objectives (i.e., general rules that govern responsibilities or 
performance)?
Yes □  No □
What is the source or authority of these manuals, policies, and guidelines? _________
22. Does your program utilize standardized forms or documents in recording treatment 
activities?
Yes □  No □
What is the source or authority of these forms or documents? _____________________
23. Who has the jurisdiction to authorize or recommend the release of a client from your 
treatment program? (Please check all appropriate boxes.)
Judge
Authorize □  
Court Admin/Staff




Authorize □  
Public Defender
Authorize □
Recommend □  
Recommend □  
Recommend □  
Recommend □  
Recommend □
Not Applicable □  
Not Applicable □  
Not Applicable □  




Authorize □  
Treatment Counselor




Recommend □  
Recommend □
Not Applicable □
Not Applicable □  
Not Applicable □
24. How involved are the following court personnel in actual treatment decisions 
regarding individual clients?
(Please check all appropriate boxes.)
Never Daily Weekly Monthly
Judges □ □ □ □
Prosecutors □ □ □ □
Court Administrators □ □ □ □
Probation Officers □ □ □ □
Public Defenders □ □ □ □
Treatment Counselors □ □ □ □
Clients □ □ □ □
Briefly describe the nature of the involvement noted above:
25. Are the goals of your program aimed at any particular part of the judicial process?
Yes □  No □
(If yes, check all boxes that apply to your program.)
Post-arrest/Diversion □  Post-sentencing □
Pre-trial/Diversion □  Probation □
Pre-sentencing □  Parole □
Other □  (Specify)__________________
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26. If your program is certified by an official body or agency, what is the name of the 
body or agency?
27. How often must your certification be renewed or reevaluated?
28. If a board or commission oversees the activities of your program, what is the name of 
the board or commission? ______________________________________________________
29. Does your program have any procedure, department, or personnel aimed at evaluating 
the overall performance of your program? Yes □  No □
If yes, briefly describe the evaluation process:
30. Under what authority was your program created? (Check appropriate box.)
By Statute □  By Judicial Administrative Directive □
By Executive Order □  By Other Administrative Directive □
By Private Agency/Citizen Action □  (Specify)_____________________
31. Are there any laws or government policies that specifically regulate or monitor the 
programmatic operation or content of your program (e.g., your state prohibits violent 
drug offenders from participation in your program)?
Yes □  No □
32. Please list one of these laws or policies below:
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Thank you for participating in this survey. Y our cooperation is greatly 
appreciated. W e hope that our findings will lead to more informed court decisions 
regarding substance abuse programs and drug treatm ent strategies. Please return 
the completed survey in the prepaid/addressed envelope. In m aking any inquiries 
about this questionnaire, please make reference to the Drug Treatm ent Component 
Survey. The person for this project is listed below:
National Center for State Courts 
300 Newport Avenue 
W illiamsburg, VA 23185-8798 
(804) 253-2000
Prim ary Contact Person 









P.O. Box 134* 
Wendell, MA 01379
UNK
Bay Cove Human Services 
Outpatient Substance Abuse Services 
66 Canal Street 
Boston, MA 02114
104
Mass General Hospital 
Addiction Services/Outpatient 
15 Parkman Street 
Ambulatory Care Center, Suite 812 
Boston, MA 02114
111
Join Together: A Nat'l Resource * 
for Communities Fighting 
Substance Abuse 
441 Stuart Street, 6th Floor 
Boston, MA 02116
UNK
After Care Services 
Outpatient Substance Abuse Services 
1A Monmouth Square 
Boston, MA 02128
64
The Kennedy Center 
Outpatient Substance Abuse Services 
27 Winthrop Street 
Charlestown MA 02129
21
Harvard Community Health Plan 
Substance Abuse Day Treatment 
23 Miner Street 
Boston, MA 02215
58
31 Legend for List of Drug Treatment Programs is as Follows:
UNK, dead-end or incorrect address/contact person;
NT, not treatment program/provider;
DR, officially declined to participate in survey or missed return deadline; and, 
*, program chosen by snow-balling method.
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Out-Client Services* 
Connecticut Halfway House 





Greater Hartford Multi-Service Center 
136 Collin Street 
Hartford, CT 06105
15
Office of Alternative Sanctions* 
2275 Silas Deane Highway 
Rocky Hill, CT 06109
28
Mount Carmel Guild 
Substance Abuse Therapy Program 
17 Mulberry Street 
Newark, NJ 07102
4
Essex Substance Abuse Treatment Center, Inc 




United Community Corp. 




Chemical Dependency Unit 
21 Main Street, Rm 111W 
Hackensack, NJ 07601
72
Bergen County Action Program 
Addictions Program 
214 State Street 
Hackensack, NJ 07601
30
Addiction Recovery Program 
905 Herrontown Road 
Princeton, NJ 08540
60
Mercer Council on Alcoholism and Drug Addiction 
408 Bellevue Avenue 
Trenton, NJ 08618
NT
Comm Guidance Center of Mercer Cnty 
Substance Abuse Recovery Program 
2300 Hamilton Avenue 
Trenton, NJ 08619
62
NY Center for Addiction Treatment Services 
Medically Supervised Outpatient 
568 Broadway, 8th Floor 
New York, NY 10012
DR
97
Washton Institute, Inc. 
Drug Abuse Treatment 
4 Park Avenue 
Ground Floor 
New York, NY 10016
DR
John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
CUNY Substance Abuse Prevention Program 
899 10th Avenue 
Room 410





New York NY 10019
17
Phase Piggy Back 
Outpatient
507 West 145th Street 
New York, NY 10031
DR.
Project Return 
1600 Macombs Road 
Bronx, NY 10452
DR
Director of Substance Abuse* 
Lincoln Hospital 
349 East 140 Street 
Bronx, NY 10454
47
Narco Extended Entry Program 
2780 3rd Avenue 
Bronx, NY 10455
DR
Argus Community Center 
Unit 1
760 East 160th Street 
Bronx, NY 10456
59
TRI Center, Inc DUPLICATE
Drug Abuse Treatment/Bronx 
400 East Forham Road 
Bronx, NY 10458
of #17
Riverdale Mental Health Assoc. 
Riverdale MH Clinic/Outpatient DF 
5676 Riverdale Avenue 
Bronx, NY 10471
DR
Health Science Center Brooklyn 
Polydrug Unit 
600 Albany Avenue 




Canarsie Aware Unit 
Outpatient
1310 Rockaway Parkway 
Brooklyn, NY 11236
NT
Saint Francis Center for Chemical Dependency 
Treatment
45th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA 15201
43
Western Psychiatric Inst. & Clinic 
3811 Ohara Street 
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
NT
Drug and Alcohol Specialist* 
Court of Common Pleas,
16th District, Courthouse 
Somerset, Pennsylvania 15501
NT
Drug & Alcohol Unit* 
GECAC TASC 
809 Peach Street 
Erie, Pennsylvania 16501
89
Drug & Alcohol Treatment & Prevention Servs.* 
108 North Stratton Street 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325
123
Treatment Access Center 





First Days Outpatient 
4936 Griscom Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19124
32
Addiction Treatment Services 
Outpatient
111 North 49th Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19139
DR
Jefferson Intensive Cocaine Treatment Program 
1021 21st Street 2nd Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19146-2632
66
Treatment Access Center* 










Line Stone Professional Bid. 




DC Superior Court Social Services Div. 
Probation/Parole Resource Ctr 
409 E. Street, NW 




Pretrial Service, District of Columbia 




The Model Treatment Center 
1300 First Street, NE 
Washington, DC 20002
120
Alcohol & Drug Abuse Services Admin 
Substance Abuse Detox Center 




Latin American Youth Center 
Drug Treatment Program 
3045 15th Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20009
22
Bureau of Rehabilitation Inc 
Community Care Center 




Consulting & Mental Health Services 




Resident Management Treatment Prgm 
4500 Quarles Street, NE 
Washington, DC 20019
DR
Foundation for Contempory MH 
Next Step 




Alcohol & Drug Administration* 
Maryland Department of Health 
201 West Preston Street 
Baltimore, MD 21201
NT






University of MD Drug Treatment Center 
Drug Free and Aftercare Clinic 
630 West Fayette Street 
Baltimore, MD 21201
84
East Baltimore Drug Abuse Center 
Treatment Unit 
707 Constitution Street 
Baltimore, MD 21202
DR
Substance Abuse Bureau* 
Baltimore City Health Depart 
303 E. Fayette Street, 6th FI 
Baltimore, MD 21202
NT
Baltimore County Office of Substance Abuse 




Community Counseling & Resource Center 
Intensive Outpatient Cocaine Treatment 
208 Washington Avenue 
Towson, MD 21204
55
Comprehensive Women's Center 
Johns Hopkins Hospital 
911 North Broadway 
Baltimore, MD 21205
56
Drug Treatment Court/Corr. Options* 
Division of Parole & Probation 
6776 Reisterstown Road, Suite 305 
Baltimore, MD 21215
NT
Total Health Care Inc. 
Substance Abuse Services 
1501 Division Street 
Baltimore, MD 21217
7
Daybreak Rehabilitation Program 




300 E. Joppa Rd, Ste 1105 
Towson, MD 21286
NT
Office of the Court 
Drug Task Force 
P.O. Box 2448 
Raleigh, NC 27602
UNK
NC Depart, of Human Resources* 





720 East Fourth Street 
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202
UNK
TASC*
145 Remount Road 
Charlotte, NC 28203
96
Substance Abuse Services 
429 Billingsley Road 
Charlotte, NC 28211
80
Blue Ridge Area Mental Health/Mental Retard.* 
and Substance Abuse Services 
283 Biltmore Avenue 
Asheville, North Carolina 28801
DR
Charleston County 
Substance Abuse Commission 




Charleston County Department of






Florence County Commission on 
Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
601 Gregg Avenue 
Florence, South Carolina 29502
DR
Prevention Centers for Disease Control* 









120 Michigan Avenue 
Daytona Beach, Florida 32114
9
DISC Village, Inc.* 




Leon County Felony Drug Ct* 




Clinical Resources Coordination* 
HRS-PD ADM AD 
1317 Winewood Boulevard 
Tallahassee, FL 32308
UNK
Pathway Add. Treatment Ctr* 
9851 University Parkway 
Pensacola, FL 32514
DR
Center for Drug Free Living* 
100 W. Columbia Street 
Orlando, Florida 32801
61
Drug and Alcohol Treatment* 
US Pretrial Services 
330 Biscayne Blvd, Ste 500 
Miami, FL 33132
108
Drug and Alcohol Treatment* 
U.S. Pretrial Services 




Drug Court of Tampa* 
DACCO
3630 N. 50th Street 
Tampa, FL 33607
33
Operation PAR, Inc.* 
10901-C Roosevelt Blvd., 
Suite 1000
St. Petersburg, FL 33716
65
Operation PAR, Inc.*
10901-C Roosevelt Boulevard 
St. Petersburg, FL 33716
DUPLICATE 
OF # 65
Coastal Recovery Ctrs, Inc.* 





4400 140th Avenue North 
Clearwater FL 34622
8
Cullman Area Mental Health Center 
Substance Abuse Services 
1909 Commerce Avenue, NW 
Cullman, AL 35055
NR
Fellowship House, Inc. 
1625 12th Avenue South 
Birmingham, AL 35205
27
Alcohol & Drug Abuse Council 




Jefferson County Economic Opport 
Alcoholism Outreach/Aftercare Pgm. 
3040 Ensley Avenue 
Birmingham, AL 35208
University of Alabama in Birmingham 
UAB Substance Abuse Programs 




Birmingham , AL TASC Program 




Court Referral Program 
300 Dexter Avenue 
Montgomery AL 36104
6
Baptist Medical Center 
Addictive Disease Program 
2105 East South Boulevard 
Montgomery, AL 36116
118
Court Referral Programs* 
Administrative Office of Courts 
817 S. Court Street 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130
NT
Agency for Substance Abuse Prev of 
Calhoun and Cleburne Counties 
1302 Noble Street 






Red Level, AL 36474
DR
Dauphin Way Lodge Treatment Services 
Quarterway/Halfway/Int Outpatient 
1009 Dauphin Street 
Mobile, AL 36604
54
Franklin Memorial Diversion 
and Treatment Program*
P.O. Box 2048 
Mobile, AL 36652
DR
Veterans Affairs Medical Center 
Psychiatry Serv Alc/Drug Dep Trt Pgm 
1030 Jefferson Avenue 
Memphis, TN 38104
DR
Methodist Outreach Inc 
2009 LaMar Avenue 
Memphis, TN 38114
DR
Frayser/Millinton Mental Health Ctr. 
Alcohol & Drug Abuse Services 
2150 Whitney Avenue 
Memphis, TN 38127
DR
Surveillance & Treatment on Probation Prog.* 
201 Mechanic Street 
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
NT
North Central Mental Health Services 
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program 
1301 North High Street 
Columbus, OH 43201
37
Neighborhood House, Inc 
Alcohol/Drug Counseling Program 
1000 Atcheson Sttet 
Columbus, OH 43203
10
Criminal Justice Administrator* 
Two Nationwide Plaza, 12th FI 
280 North High Street 
Columbus, OH 43215
NT
Two Nationwide Plaza, 12 FI* 
280 North High Street 
Columbus, OH 43215
NT
Community Guidance Inc 
Genesis House 
3134 Euclid Avenue 
Cleveland, OH 44106
DR
Matt Talbot Inn 
Residential
2270 Professsor Avenue 
Cleveland, OH 44113
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Catholic Social Services of Cuyahoga County 
Chemical Dependency Services 




Cleveland Treatment Center 
1127 Carnegie Avenue 
Cleveland, OH 44115
114
Quest Recovery Services-Alematives Prog.* 
1341 North Market Street 
Canton, Ohio 44714
DR
Hamilton County Alcohol and 
Drug Addiction Services Board* 




Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas 
41 North Perry Street Room 107.
Dayton, Ohio 45422-2001
53
Elkhart County Alcohol & Drug Abuse Program* 
315 South 2nd Street 
Elkhart, Indiana 46516
23
Cass County Alcohol Drug Court Program* 
928 1/2 East Market Street 
Logansport, Indiana 46947
18
Miami County Alcohol & Drug Court Program* 




Wabash Addiction Care Center, Rochester 
100 West Ninth Street, Suite 301 
Rochester, Indiana 46975
UNK
Wabash Addiction CareCenter 




Wabash Valley Hospitalty 
Outpatient Services/101 Suzie Lane 
Attica, Indiana 47918
35
Newton Co. Superior Court,* 
c/o Ryan & Ryan 
Consulting Medical Arts Building 
125 South McKinley Street 
Rensselaer, Indiana 47978
NT
Comprehensive Services, Inc. 




Substance Abuse TRT and Prev Prgm 
17357 Klinger Street 
First Community Baptist Church 
Detroit, MI 48212
DR
Community Corrections Center 
Monica House 
15380 Monica Street 
Detroit, MI 48238
86
Drug Case Management* 
State Court Admin Office 
611 W. Ottawa 










Abuse Treatment Center 








333 MoDRoe Avenue N.W. 
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49504
5
Kent County Court Services Dept.* 
Hall of Justice Room 302 
333 MoDRoe Avenue, NW 
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49504
49
Rock Valley Correctional Programs* 




Lifeworks Chemical Dependency Center 
Ottawa Substance Abuse Services 
214 North Ottawa Street 
Joliet, IL 60431
DR
Illinois Depart of Alcoholism*
& Substance Abuse Adv Council 
1560 Sanburg Terrace, #1104 
Chicago, IL 60610
NT
Northwestern Memorial Hospital 
Chemical Dependency Program 






2723 North Clark Street 
1st & 2nd Floors 
Chicago, IL 60614
DR
Brass Foundation Inc 
8000 South Racine Avenue 
Chicago, IL 60620
DR
BASTA Drug Abuse Treatment Program 








Substance Abuse Services* 
Human Resources Dev. Inst. 
222 South Jefferson Street 
Chicago, IL 60661
99
Chemical Dependency Services* 
Central K.C. Mental Health Service 
600 East 22nd Street 
Kansas City, MO 64108
40
Addiction Treatment Center* 
St, Joseph Medical Center 
3600 E. Hairy 
Wichita,KS 67218
DR
Jefferson Ale/ Drug Abuse Clinic* 
401 Veterans Boulevar, Ste 102 
Methrie, LA 70005
DR
Jefferson Regional Medical Center 
First Step Chemical Dependency Unit 
1515 West 42nd Avenue 
Pine Bluff, AR 71603
94
VGS Inc
2525 San Jacinto St. 
Houston, TX 77002
97
Assoc for the Adv of Mexican Americans 
Comp Inhalent Drug Abuse Program 
204 Clifton Street 
Houston, TX 77011
76
MCC Behavioral Care Inc. 




Methodist Hospital & Baylor College 
of Medicine Chem Depend. Program 
6565 Fannin Street 
Houston, TX 77030
UNK
Adult Rehabilitation Services 
6624 Homwood Street 
Houston, TX 77074
3
Gulf Coast Community Services Assoc. 
Substance Abuse Services Program 
6300 Bowling Green Street 
Houston, TX 77201
DR
Jefferson Cnty Intervention Prgm* 
Jefferson County Courthouse 
1149 Pearl Street 
Beaumont, TX 77701
31
Mexican American Unity Council 
Casa Del Sol/Casa Adelante 
2303 West Commerce Street 




Travis Cty Drug Diversion Ct 




Drug Diversion Court 
Travis County Pretrial Srvs 




Drug and Alcohol Treatment Institute 
Clarence Lawson Foundation 
2230 North 24th Street 
Phoenix, AZ 85008
63
44th Street Drug Abuse Program 
Larkspur Medical Center 





3101 East Watkins Road 
Phoenix, AZ 85034
46
Prehab of Arizona, Inc.
Homestead Girls Residence Program 
P.O. Box 5860 
Mesa, AZ 85211
52
Maricopa Punishment Program* 
Substance Abuse Component 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
400 N. Seventh St.
Maricopa, AZ 85239
DR
Criminal Justice Program* 
COPE Behavioral Services 








La Frontera Central Office 
502 West 29th Street 
Tucson, AZ 85713
110
Charles E. Drew First Offender 
King Drew Substance Abuse Program 
9307 South Central Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90002
98
Bay Area Addiction Research/TRT Inc. 
BAART/CAL Detox/Southeast Clinic 
Los Angeles, CA 90011
115
Depart of Health Services* 
Alcohol & Drug Program Admin. 
714 West Olympic Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90015
44
East Los Angeles Health Task Force 
Comprehensive Substance Abuse Pgm 
630 South Saint Louis Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90023
DR
SunRise Community 
Counseling Center In/Outpatient 
1925 West Temple Street 
Suite 205
Los Angeles, CA 90026
90
MCC Managed Behavioral Care of CA 
400 South Spulveda Street 
Manhattan Beach, CA 90026
DR
Gay and Lesbian Community Ser. Ctr. 
Addiction Recovery Srvces/Los Angeles 
1625 North Hudson Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90028
107
Behavioral Systems 
1800 N. Highland Avenue 
Suite 318
Los Angeles, CA 90028
79
LAC/USC Med Ctr Prof Staff Assoc. 
Infants of Subst Abuse Mothers Clinic 
1129 North State Street 
Room 1D35
Los Angeles, CA 90033
DR
Alternative Action Programs 
2511 South Barrington Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90064
UNK
Kaiser Permanente/Culver Marina 
Chemical Dependency Recovery Pgm 
1201 West Washington Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90066
DR
Compton Special Services Center 
404 North Alameda Street 
Compton, CA 90221
112
Inglewood Mental Health Service 
Drug Abuse Treatment Program 
4450 West Century Boulevard 
Inglewood, CA 90304
48
Fresh Start Training Center 
1167 East215th Place 
Carson, CA 90745
UNK
Long Beach Alcohol & Drug Rehab Pgm
North Clinic
6335 Myrtle Avenue
Long Beach, CA 90805
109
Impact Drug and Alcohol * 
Treatment Center 
P.O. Box 93607 
Pasadena, CA 91109
75
City of Chino 
Human Services Division 
13271 Central Avenue 
Chino, CA 91710
121
Alvarado Parkway Institute 
Chemical Dependency Program 
7050 Parkway Boulevard 
La Mesa, CA 91942
DR
Episcopal Community Services (ECS) 
East County Accord 
900 North Cuyamaca Street Suite 100 
El Cajon, CA 92020
73
Episcopal Community Services (ECS) 
East County Neighborhood Recovery Ctr 
1089 El Cajon Boulevard 
El Cajon, CA 92020
NT
Professional Community Services 
900 North Cuyamaca Street 
Suite 201
El Cajon, CA 92020
NT
Desert Dawn Centers 
Drug & Alcohol Prevention 
569 East King Street 
Banning, CA 92220
DR
Imperical County MH ALC and Drug 
Programs 
Outpatient Clinic 
1073 West Ross Avenue, Suite F 
El Centro, CA 92243
105
Volunteers of America 
Imperical Alcohol and Drug Program 
1331 Clark Road 
El Centro, CA 92243
71
Treatment and Recovery Ventura Cnty 




955 east Telephone Road
Ventura, CA 93003
69
County of Ventura, Alcohol 
Drug Programs*
4651 Telephone Rd, #210 
Ventura, CA 93003
67




Special Treatment Education and 
Prevention Services, Inc. (STEPS) 
3533 Mount Vernon Avenue 
Bakersfield, CA 93306
45
Central Coast Headway/Lompoc 
Drug & Alcohol Awareness Program 
1100 West Laurel Avenue 
Lompoc, CA 93436
100
Haight Ashbury Free Clinics 
Alcohol Treatment Services 
1698 Haight Street 
San Francisco, CA 94117
117
Oakland Community Counseling Center 




14th Street Clinic & Medical Group 




Oakland Municipal Court 
661 Washington Street 
Oakland, California 94607
103
Merritt Peralta Institute 
Treatment Services 
435 Hawthorne Avenue 
Oakland, CA 94609
DR
Department of Corrections* 
Probation and Parole 




Alcohol and Drag Program* 
3701 Branch Center Road 
Sacramento, CA 95827
DR
ASAP Treatment Services, Inc. 




De Paul Adult Treatment Center 
1320 SW Washington Street 
Portland, OR 97205
DR
Harmony House Inc* 
4940 SE Woodstock 
Portland, OR 97206
74
Kaiser Permanente Recovery Resource 
2330 N.E. Siskiyou 
Portland, OR 97212
38
Providence Addictions/Diversion Program* 




1135 S.E. Salmon St. 
Portland, OR 97214
39
Northwest Treatment Services 




Coda Drag Treatment Services 
306 NE 20th Street 
Portland, OR 97232
116
Oregon Office of Alcohol and Drag Abuse Programs* 
500 Summer Street, N.E.
Salem, OR 97310
NT
Drag Free Systems/TASC* 
811 First Avenue, Ste 610 
Seattle, WA 98104
83
Cornerstone Treatment Centers, Inc. 
610 44th Street, NW 
Seattle, WA 98107
DR
Central Seattle Recovery Center 
Jefferson Street Unit 
1401 East Jefferson Street, Suite 300 
Seattle, WA 98122
DR
Therapeutic Treatment Center 




Detox Center/Outpatient Treatment 




Pierce County Alliance* 




Washington Department of 
Social and Health Services 
P.O. Box 45330 
Olympia, WA 98504-5330
NT
Center for Drug Treatment 
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